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I.  INTRODUCTION 
“Most men . . . think themselves in possession of all truth, and 
that wherever others differ from them it is so far error.”1 
At the founding of our nation, the grounds for disqualification of 
judges and justices were very few and fairly narrow.  In fact, the only 
ground for disqualifying a jurist was that he possessed a direct 
pecuniary interest in the pending case.2  Since that time, the grounds for 
judicial disqualification have slowly, but steadily, been broadened—by 
both the legislatures and the courts.3  Now jurists may be disqualified in 
all federal courts and most state courts on account of:  (1) a financial or 
other personal interest; (2) a relational interest; (3) a political interest; or 
(4) other reasons reflecting actual, probable, or apparent partiality.4 
This expansion of the grounds for disqualification reflects a shift in 
social science from the 18th to the 21st Centuries that changed the 
public’s view of the psychology of judges.5  The 18th Century jurist was 
revered as a rational economic man vulnerable only to the sway of 
financial interests.6  But, we are all legal realists now and are more likely 
to view jurists as ordinary people influenced by both conscious and non-
conscious motives.  This shift in perspective over time has resulted in 
                                                 
1 Benjamin Franklin, Literary Trials:  Constitutional Convention Speech, in 36 LITIGATION 1, 
64 (2010). 
2 See infra Part II.B (discussing a judge’s relational interest in a case). 
3 See infra Part III (noting the broadening of judicial disqualification in both the 
legislature and courts). 
4 See infra Part II.A–C (providing examples of interests that a jurist may be disqualified 
for). 
5 See infra Part IV.A (showing a shift in the grounds for disqualification and its effect on 
the public’s view of judges). 
6 See infra Part II.C (describing how 18th Century jurists could be swayed by money 
bribes). 
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reforms of the substantive standards to include an increasing number of 
specific interest-based grounds for disqualification.7  However, there has 
been little, if any, reshaping of the procedural practices used in 
disqualification disputes.8  In fact, in all federal and most state courts the 
challenged jurist remains the initial, and often final, arbiter of his own 
actual, probable, or apparent partiality—a practice adopted long ago 
from English common law.9 
As a result, we are left with an out-of-date and out-of-sync system in 
which the practice of “self-disqualification” prevails and other 
procedural protections are eschewed.  At the same time, the substantive 
standards have shifted to require the challenged jurist to make an 
objective assessment of his own actual, probable, or apparent biases in an 
increasing number of instances.10  This chancy combination of the 
substantive standards and the procedural practices introduces the risk of 
systemic error in disqualification decisions because it requires the 
challenged jurist to be unbiased about his own biases.11  That objectivity, 
we now know, is virtually impossible due to the Bias Blind Spot.12  As a 
result, the procedural practices used in disqualification disputes need to 
be reshaped to account for the Bias Blind Spot.13 
Given how the Bias Blind Spot operates, those reforms must include:  
(1) either eliminating the challenged jurist from the decision making 
process or, at a minimum, providing for prompt de novo review of the 
challenged jurist’s determination; (2) requiring meaningful disclosure by 
both the jurist and the parties; and (3) mandating that any order denying 
disqualification be in writing, include reasons, and be published.14 
In support of this thesis, Part II of this Article describes the most 
prevalent and persistent problems with partiality through a series of 
examples from the United States Supreme Court and the highest state 
courts, which illuminate the four basic types of conflicts or biases.15  In 
Part III the interplay of substantive standards and current procedural 
                                                 
7 See infra Part III.A (explaining specific federal and state interest-based grounds for 
disqualification). 
8 See infra Part V (analyzing the ways in which recusal procedures need to be reshaped 
to avoid the Bias Blind Spot). 
9 See infra Part III.C (noting that federal and most state courts use self-disqualification). 
10 See infra Part III.A.5 (discussing the objective standard used by federal and state codes 
of judicial conduct). 
11 See infra Part IV.A (providing that the Bias Blind Spot distorts disqualification 
decisions). 
12 See infra Part IV (defining the Bias Blind Spot). 
13 See infra Part V.A (recommending new procedural reforms for self-disqualification). 
14 See infra Part V.A (listing the procedural reforms). 
15 See infra Part II (describing the problems with partiality). 
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practices in disqualification disputes is examined.16  In Part IV the 
fundamental features of the Bias Blind Spot that interfere with a jurist’s 
clear vision of his own biases are described so that the procedural 
reforms suggested in Part V can be evaluated for effectiveness.17  Part V 
also addresses the most common criticisms or challenges to the proposed 
procedural reforms.18  In Part VI the primary purposes of partiality in 
our justice system—protection of litigants’ rights to a fair trial, creation 
of public confidence in the courts, and support of jurists as ethical 
actors—are explored to give a clearer vision of the goals that recusal 
reform should realize.19  This Article concludes that the proposed 
procedural reforms will further the identified goals of disqualification by 
creating disqualification procedures that are, or at least appear to be, 
impartial.20 
II.  PARTIALITY PROBLEMS 
The problem of judicial partiality pre-dates the creation of our nation 
and has persisted throughout recorded time.21  In fact, some of the 
earliest references to judicial conflicts of interest in Western literary and 
legal texts date back to antiquity.22  Since that time, both literature and 
the law have chronicled persistent problems with the partiality of 
jurists.23  While there are a variety of ways these partiality problems 
could be categorized, at least one well-respected scholar has identified 
four general grounds for disqualification based upon a jurist’s partiality:  
(1) financial and other personal interests; (2) relational interests; (3) 
political interests; and (4) other bias.24  These four general grounds are 
                                                 
16 See infra Part III (examining substantive and current procedural practices). 
17 See infra Part IV (describing the Bias Blind Spot). 
18 See infra Part V (addressing criticisms to the proposed procedural reforms). 
19 See infra Part VI (exploring goals of recusal reform). 
20 See infra Part VII (concluding that the proposed procedural reforms will further the 
goals of disqualification). 
21 See Charles Gardner Geyh, The Dimensions of Judicial Impartiality, 65 FLA. L. REV. 493, 
498 (2013) [hereinafter The Dimensions of Judicial Impartiality] (noting that impartiality dates 
back to antiquity). 
22 See id. (quoting FRANKLIN ADAM PIERCE, BOOK OF QUOTATIONS 466 (1952).  “Plato 
recounts that in 399 BC Socrates described a judge’s responsibilities in the following way:  
‘Four things belong to a judge:  to hear courteously, to answer wisely, to consider soberly, 
and to decide impartially.’”  Id. 
23 See id. at 499 (discussing partiality problems of the past with reference to literature). 
24 See id. at 499–505 (describing four categories of partiality problems).  The terms 
“impartial” and “unbiased” are not identical.  The Black’s Law Dictionary defines 
“impartial” as “unbiased and disinterested.”  BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 568 (10th ed. 2014).  
The term “bias” is defined as an inclination, prejudice, or predilection and “disinterested” 
means “free from bias, prejudice, or partiality [or] not having a pecuniary interest.”  Id.  
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briefly described and illustrative recent examples are explained to set the 
stage for a discussion about how the combination of current substantive 
standards and procedural rules creates partiality problems that the 
reforms suggested in this Article are designed to address.25 
A. Financial or Other Personal Interests in the Case 
There are several types of personal interests that may disqualify a 
jurist from hearing a case, but the most common and obvious are 
financial interests.26  The “archetype of the partial judge is the corrupt 
jurist who solicits or accepts bribes.”27  However, partial judges are not 
limited to those who take the bribes, but also include jurists who actually 
do or, at least appear to, misuse judicial power for personal gain in other 
forms:  indirect financial benefit, sexual favors, and reputational 
interests.28  These partiality problems exist for jurists presiding over 
cases in both the federal and state court systems, including the courts of 
last resort.29  
In recent years the financial and personal interests of judges and 
justices who are elected to the bench have received a lot of attention in 
the scholarly and public debates.30  Perhaps the most notable recent 
example at the level of a state’s highest court is Caperton v. A.T. Massey 
Coal Company, Inc., in which the acting Chief Justice Brett Benjamin 
refused to recuse himself even though the CEO of the party in whose 
favor Chief Justice Benjamin voted had provided nearly $3.5 million to 
support the jurist’s election to the state supreme court because Chief 
Justice Benjamin believed he was not, in fact, biased.31  The matter was 
litigated all the way to the United States Supreme Court (“SCOTUS”), 
which held that the Due Process Clause of the U.S. Constitution 
mandated Chief Justice Benjamin’s disqualification because the election 
                                                                                                             
While these terms are not exactly synonymous, they are sufficiently similar—at least when 
used in the judicial disqualification context—as to be used interchangeably in this Article. 
25 See infra Part II.A–D (discussing partiality problems). 
26 See The Dimensions of Judicial Impartiality, supra note 21, at 500 (finding examples of 
personal interests that suggest actual, probable, or apparent partiality in literature).  
27 Id. at 499. 
28 See id. at 499–501 (exploring literature and actual cases to provide examples of bribes, 
indirect financial benefits, and sexual favors gained through abuse of judicial power). 
29 See infra notes 31–35 and accompanying text (discussing the partiality of state and 
federal judges).  
30 See infra notes 31–38 and accompanying text (providing examples of judges with 
financial interests). 
31  Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., Inc., 679 S.E.2d 223, 285–86 (W. Va. 2008) 
(Benjamin, C.J., concurring) (stating that “the touchstone of a judicial system’s fairness is 
actual justice” which “derives from actual impartiality”). 
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support offered by an interested party created “a constitutionally 
intolerable probability of actual bias.”32 
However, even jurists appointed for life terms are not immune from 
partiality problems based upon personal interests-financial or 
otherwise.33  For example, in 2011, the impartiality of both Justice Scalia 
and Justice Thomas was questioned because they participated in the 
Citizens United v. FEC case after both Justices apparently attended an 
invitation-only political retreat hosted by Koch Industries, Inc., whose 
political action committee supported the dismantling of the campaign 
finance laws at issue in the Citizens United case.34  Of course, Justices 
Scalia and Thomas are not the only federal judges to attend such 
junkets.35  In addition, there are other examples of questionable refusals 
to recuse involving the personal interests (involving the reputations and 
prior participation) of SCOTUS Justices, including the following cases.36 
In 1972, Justice Rehnquist declined to disqualify himself in Laird v. 
Tatum, which involved a challenge to the constitutionality of a domestic 
surveillance program that targeted Vietnam War dissidents.37  Although 
he had testified before Congress in support of the program at issue, 
Justice Rehnquist participated in the case.38  The backlash to Rehnquist’s 
refusal to recuse was so strong that it helped galvanize the need for 
                                                 
32 Id. at 868, 882. 
33 See, e.g., Justice Rehnquist’s Decision to Participate in Laird v. Tatum, 73 COLUM. L. REV 
106, 117 (1973) [hereinafter Rehnquist’s Decision] (discussing Justice Rehnquist’s 
participation in Laird v. Tatum); Jeanne Cummings, Reform Group:  Antonin Scalia, Clarence 
Thomas Had Citizens United Conflicts of Interest, POLITICO (Jan. 19, 2011, 7:27 PM), 
http://www.politico.com/news/stories/0111/47855.html, archived at http://perma.cc/ 
XK7Q-DKRU (reviewing a reform group’s call for an investigation of Justices Scalia and 
Thomas’ opinions in Citizens United). 
34 See Eric Lichtblau, Advocacy Group Says Justices May Have Conflict in Campaign Finance 
Cases, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 19, 2011), available at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/01/20/us/ 
politics/20koch.html?_r=0&pagewanted=print, archived at http://perma.cc/V6RA-P35M 
(discussing Common Cause’s request for an investigation of Justices Thomas and Scalia). 
35 See, e.g., Editorial, Time to Ban Judicial Junkets, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 15, 2005), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2005/10/15/opinion/15sat3.html?_r=0, archived at 
http://perma.cc/3STT-YEFH (calling for bold action against private interests lobbying 
judges); Glen Elsasser, Activists Shine Light on Junkets for Judges, CHI. TRIB. (July 25, 2000), 
http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2000-07-25/news/0007250276_1_federal-judges-
community-rights-counsel-seminars, archived at http://perma.cc/U8YY-V86M (providing 
examples of other federal judges who attend all expenses paid seminars). 
36 See infra notes 37–41 and accompanying text (citing examples of justices that have 
declined to recuse themselves). 
37 See Rehnquist’s Decision, supra note 33, at 117 (discussing Justice Rehnquist’s 
participation as a witness for the Justice Department’s issue on government surveillance); 
Jeffrey W. Stempel, Rehnquist, Recusal, and Reform, 53 BROOK. L. REV. 589, 592 (1987) 
(reviewing Justice Rehnquist’s service as head of the Justice Department’s Office of Legal 
Counsel to the White House). 
38 Stempel, supra note 37, at 592. 
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reform that resulted in Congress passing legislation to amend the federal 
recusal statute.39 
In 2003, Justice Breyer participated when SCOTUS decided 
Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America v. Walsh, in which an 
association of drug manufacturers challenged the constitutionality of 
certain state prescription drug regulations.40  Some legal ethicists 
questioned Justice Breyer’s participation in the case because the Justice 
held stock in some of the pharmaceutical companies that were members 
of the association.41 
B. Relational Interests in the Case 
There may be concern in a given case that a jurist’s impartiality 
could be compromised due to pre-existing personal relationships with 
litigants or other parties interested in the outcome of the case.42  The 
interested person may be family, a “friend,” or a “foe” of the jurist.43  
Again, these problems arise at the highest levels in both the federal and 
court state systems.44 
In 2008, Justice Annette Ziegler of the Wisconsin Supreme Court was 
publicly reprimanded by her colleagues for presiding over cases when 
she was an appeals court judge in which her husband’s business was a 
party to the litigation.45  These same relational interests can affect 
SCOTUS Justices.46  In fact, a personal relationship was at the heart of the 
dispute in the 1945 case of Jewell Ridge Coal Corp. v. Local 6167.47  In that 
                                                 
39 See id. at 594–95 & n.32 (noting the additional momentum Justice Rehnquist’s 
participation gave to reformists). 
40 See Monroe H. Freedman, Judicial Impartiality in the Supreme Court—The Troubling Case 
of Justice Stephen Breyer, 30 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 513, 527 (2005) (discussing Justice Breyer’s 
stock held in one of the three pharmaceutical companies that was suing Pharmaceutical 
Research and Manufactures of America). 
41 Id. at 527. 
42 The Dimensions of Judicial Impartiality, supra note 21, at 502. 
43 Id. 
44 See infra notes 45–54 and accompanying text (providing examples of justices with 
relational interests in a case). 
45 See Steven Elbow, State Supreme Court Reprimands Ziegler in Unprecedented Ruling, CAP. 
TIMES (May 28, 2008), http://www.highbeam.com/doc/1G1-179495976.html, archived at 
http://perma.cc/8SBV-NPRN (discussing Justice Ziegler’s public reprimand); Dee J. Hall, 
Ziegler is Given a Public Reprimand, MADISON.COM (May 29, 2008, 12:00 AM), 
http://host.madison.com/news/ziegler-is-given-a-public-reprimand/article_07a048a5-
6e12-533a-b78c-6059e7d6c120.html, archived at http://perma.cc/Z7PP-VRDQ (describing 
Justice Ziegler’s conflict of interest in cases). 
46 See infra notes 47–54 and accompanying text (providing examples of Supreme Court 
Justices with relational interests in cases). 
47 See ALLIANCE FOR JUSTICE, A SUPREME COURT JUSTICE’S RECUSAL DECISIONS SHOULD BE 
TRANSPARENT AND REVIEWABLE 4 (2011), available at http://www.afj.org/wp-
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 49, No. 3 [2015], Art. 10
https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol49/iss3/10
2015] Reshaping Recusal Procedures 815 
case, Justice Black declined to disqualify himself even though his former 
law partner represented one of the victorious litigants.48  Justice Black’s 
decision to participate in the rehearing engendered strong criticisms 
from his colleague, Justice Robert Jackson.49 
While there was no reprimand or even reproach by his colleagues, 
Justice Scalia was called to task by some scholars and the media when he 
refused to recuse himself from a case brought by the Sierra Club against 
then Vice-President Dick Cheney.50  Apparently, while the case was 
impending, Justice Scalia (and some of his family members) went duck 
hunting with Cheney and accepted a free ride on the Vice-President’s 
jet.51  Despite loud calls questioning whether he appeared to be 
impartial, Justice Scalia denied the Sierra Club’s request that he step 
aside and then cast his vote in support of the Vice President’s position in 
the litigation.52 
More recently, Justice Thomas’ participation in the challenge to the 
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act was criticized by liberal 
members of Congress and some commentators.53  They raised questions 
about Justice Thomas’ partiality because Ginni Thomas, the Justice’s 
wife, was a founder and active supporter of Liberty Central, and a well-
paid lobbyist for the Heritage Foundation and other conservative 
political organizations that supported overturning the law.54 
                                                                                                             
content/uploads/2013/11/recusal-afj-memo.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/475W-GP4Q 
(discussing Justice Black’s participation in the case).  
48 See id. (discussing Justice Black’s refusal to recuse himself).  
49 See Jewell Ridge Coal Corp. v. Local 6167, 325 U.S. 897, 897 (1945) (Jackson, J., 
concurring) (listing the limited grounds on which Justice Jackson concurred). 
50 See Monroe H. Freedman, Duck-Blind Justice:  Justice Scalia’s Memorandum in the 
Cheney Case, 18 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 229, 229 (2004) (evaluating Justice Scalia’s decision to 
not recuse himself in Cheney v. United States Dist. Court for the Dist. of Columbia). 
51 See Michael C. Dorf, Justice Scalia’s Persuasive But Elitist Response to the Duck Hunting 
Controversy, FINDLAW (Mar. 24, 2004), http://writ.news.findlaw.com/dorf/20040324.html, 
archived at http://perma.cc/9ULG-KMXA (explaining why Justice Scalia’s trip with Vice-
President Dick Cheney creates the appearance of impropriety).  
52 See Cheney v. United States Dist. Court for the Dist. of Columbia, 541 U.S. 913, 929 
(2004) (providing the order by Justice Scalia denying Sierra Club’s motion to disqualify 
him). 
53 See Felicia Sonmez, House Democrats Say Thomas Should Recuse Himself in Health-Care 
Case, WASH. POST (Feb. 9, 2011, 12:21 PM), http://voices.washingtonpost.com/44/2011/ 
02/house-democrats-say-justice-th.html, archived at http://perma.cc/M3VS-XSEP 
(reviewing a letter asking Justice Thomas to recuse himself).  
54 See id. (reviewing the conflict of interest between Justice Thomas and his wife, Ginni 
Thomas’ role as a lobbyist). 
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C. Political Interests in the Case 
The possible influence of political interests or ideologies is another 
concern when a jurist’s impartiality—whether actual, probable, or 
apparent—is at stake.55  The political interests that might influence a case 
can be divided into interests emanating from external and internal 
sources.56  External political interests are those that threaten a jurist’s 
impartiality because his “political future is subject to manipulation or 
control by others who have an interest in the outcomes of cases the 
[jurist] decides.”57  Internal political interests “relate to ideological zeal, 
which can bias the [jurist] for or against litigants and lead [the jurist] to 
prejudge cases.”58  There have been a number of recent high profile cases 
in both state and federal courts where the impartiality of a jurist was 
questioned based upon either external or internal political interests.59 
The political interests of jurists are most often questioned in 
instances where judges are elected or when the jurist presides over 
politically sensitive or other controversial cases.  The Caperton case and 
other recent examples of high-stakes judicial elections exemplify external 
political interests because the elected jurist is, probably is, or at least 
appears to be, beholden to the special interest groups that help elect 
them.60  However, even jurists who are appointed for life terms may be 
improperly influenced by internal politics.61  The most common modern 
concerns involve so called “activist judges”—jurists whose 
interpretations and applications of applicable law are, or appear to be, 
influenced by the jurist’s personal ideology.62  The claims of judicial 
activism come from both the right and left ends of the political spectrum 
and even involve jurists at the highest level of the federal and state court 
systems.63  In fact, some recent cases pending before SCOTUS have given 
                                                 
55 The Dimensions of Judicial Impartiality, supra note 21, at 503. 
56 Id. 
57 Id. 
58 Id. 
59 See infra notes 60–62 and accompanying text (providing examples of judges with a 
political interest in a case). 
60 See supra notes 37–41 and accompanying text (giving examples of cases where 
Supreme Court Justices had a personal interest). 
61 See The Dimensions of Judicial Impartiality, supra note 21, at 505 (noting that even 
Supreme Court Justices are accused of judicial activism). 
62 Id. (describing earlier efforts by conservative court critics against liberal leaning jurists 
“who allegedly disregarded the law and substituted their political preferences” when 
making decisions and the more recent efforts of liberals to label jurists whose decisions are 
seen as more conservative as “judicial activists” as well). 
63 See id. (discussing claims of judicial activism that emanate from conservatives and 
liberals). 
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rise to controversies regarding the political ideologies of some of the 
Justices.64 
The problem of political interests is well illustrated by calls from 
conservatives in recent years for Justice Ginsberg to recuse herself from 
cases involving abortion and other reproductive rights issues, which are 
based upon the fact that she was a member of the NOW Legal Defense 
and Education Fund team before serving as a jurist.65  In fact, in 2004, 
when NOW’s advocacy group filed an amicus curie brief in a case testing 
a state’s obligations to provide medical screenings to low-income 
children, some on the political right criticized Justice Ginsberg for taking 
part in the case because of her NOW affiliation.66  Justice Ginsberg was 
criticized again when only two weeks later she gave the opening 
remarks at the Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg Distinguished Lecture Series 
on Women and the Law, which was co-sponsored by NOW.67  Thus, 
even jurists who are not subject to election can be seen as influenced by 
political forces. 
D. Personal Bias for or Against a Party or Participant 
The type of personal bias in this category is a catch-all for forms of 
partiality that do not neatly fit within the descriptions of the jurist’s 
personal (especially financial), relational, or political interests.68  While 
some interests and biases will overlap, this last category includes bias for 
or against persons because they are members of a particular race, 
nationality, ethnicity, gender, socio-economic class, sexual orientation or 
other identifiable group.69  Again, in recent years challenges of personal 
bias for or against a party or participant have been raised against jurists 
at all levels on both the federal and state bench.70 
The sponsors of California’s Proposition 8, which would have 
banned gay marriage, sought to disqualify the presiding jurist, Chief 
Judge Walker, who is a gay man in a long-term relationship.71  After 
                                                 
64 See infra notes 64–66 and accompanying text (providing an example of cases before the 
Supreme Court involving bias controversies).  
65 Richard A. Serrano & David G. Savage, Ginsburg Has Ties to Activist Group, L.A. TIMES 
(Mar. 11, 2004), http://articles.latimes.com/2004/mar/11/nation/na-ginsbug11, archived 
at http://perma.cc/G9NX-3376. 
66 Id. 
67 See id. (citing to several legal experts’ opinions on the matter). 
68 The Dimensions of Judicial Impartiality, supra note 21, at 505. 
69 See id. at 505–507 (providing examples from literature to describe status or group 
based bias). 
70 See infra notes 70–73 and accompanying text (noting that accusations of bias affect 
jurists at all levels). 
71 See Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 790 F. Supp. 1119, 1122–23 (N.D. Cal. 2011) (describing 
the motion of the defendant-intervenors seeking to vacate the judgment on the grounds the 
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Chief Judge Walker retired (and when his order holding the law 
unconstitutional was on appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Ninth Circuit), a newspaper article reported that Chief Judge Walker 
“shared that he was gay and that he was in a [long-term] same-sex 
relationship at the time when he was presiding over this case.”72  
Thereafter, the sponsors of Proposition 8 sought an order from the 
United States District Court for the Northern District of California 
challenging former Chief Judge Walker’s participation in the trial citing 
his sexual orientation.73  The new Chief Judge of the court ruled that 
Judge Walker was not biased and did not have to recuse himself simply 
because he was gay and might be affected by the ruling as a private 
citizen.74 
Similarly, activists on the political left have taken issue with Justice 
Scalia’s participation in the cases regarding recognition of gay marriages 
under federal and state law.75  The challengers do more than simply 
criticize Justice Scalia’s participation based upon his dissenting opinions 
in earlier gay rights cases, which would not be grounds for 
disqualification.76  Instead, the challengers point to Justice Scalia’s 
remarks at a book tour event at Princeton University when he responded 
to a gay student’s question about Justice Scalia’s opinions in those prior 
gay rights cases.77 
                                                                                                             
presiding judge was or could reasonably appear to be biased based upon his sexual 
orientation). 
72 Id. at 1121. 
73 See id. (stating that the Motion to Vacate was based on the premise that Judge 
Walker’s same-sex relationship disqualified him from presiding over the case). 
74 See id. at 1128, 1130, 1133 (denying motion of defendant-intervenors seeking to vacate 
the judgment on the grounds the presiding judge was or could reasonably appear to be 
biased based upon his membership in class of persons who might benefit from the ruling); 
see also Maura Dolan, Gay Judge Not Required to Remove Himself from Same-Sex Marriage Case, 
U.S. Judge Rules, L.A. TIMES (June 15, 2011), http://articles.latimes.com/2011/jun/15/ 
local/la-me-0615-gay-judge-20110616, archived at http://perma.cc/3XX6-SU8T (quoting 
Judge Ware on the unreasonableness of the assumption that Judge Walker could not render 
an impartial judgment). 
75 See Jim Morrison, Op-Ed:  Scalia Too Biased to Judge Marriage Cases, ADVOCATE (Dec. 27, 
2012, 1:48 PM), http://www.advocate.com/commentary/2012/12/27/scalia-too-biased-
judge-upcoming-marriage-cases, archived at http://perma.cc/Z6GY-8N5N (discussing 
reasons for LGBT activists calling for Justice Scalia to recuse himself).  
76 See RICHARD E. FLAMM, JUDICIAL DISQUALIFICATION:  RECUSAL AND DISQUALIFICATION 
OF JUDGES 318–22 (2d ed. 2007) (stating that a jurist’s participation in a prior case involving 
a party or similar facts or participation in a prior proceeding in the same case, without 
more, does not disqualify the jurist). 
77 See Morrison, supra note 75 (noting Scalia equated the moral opposition to 
homosexuality akin to the moral opposition to murder).  But see Erin Fuchs, Here’s Why 
Scalia Should NOT Recuse Himself from the Gay Marriage Cases, BUSINESS INSIDER (Dec. 13, 
2012, 1:30 PM), http://www.businessinsider.com/why-scalia-should-hear-gay-marriage-
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E. A Common Thread in Partiality Problems 
In each of these situations, the grounds for the appearance of 
partiality (if not an actual or probable partiality problem) are different, 
but they all resulted in an initial decision denying disqualification.78  
Some scenarios involve the jurist’s financial or other personal interests.79  
In other instances, doubts about impartiality are created by the jurist’s 
relationships with interested parties.80  In some matters the political 
interests or ideology of the jurist may influence the decision.81  In a few 
cases, there are even questions of bias for or against a party or 
participant based upon their membership of a specific interest group.82  
But, in spite of the variety of circumstances, in each case the initial 
decision was to deny the jurist was disqualified.83 
This is not to suggest that the jurists were, in fact, partial or even that 
if all the facts about the described situations were known that would 
raise reasonable doubts in the mind of others to create an appearance of 
partiality.  Instead, the point is that there is reason to pause and consider 
more carefully the questions raised by these disqualification challenges 
and the resulting decisions.  Such serious reflection reveals one striking 
feature of all these disputes—the challenged jurist was the sole (and in 
courts of last resort the final) arbiter of his own impartiality.84  Given 
what we know about the Bias Blind Spot, this feature of disqualification 
decisions requires more attention and should be the focus of recusal 
reform efforts.  In other words, to properly reform recusal practice, we 
must reshape the procedures (and perhaps the substantive standards) 
used to decide when disqualification is warranted. 
                                                                                                             
2012-12#!Hmsjc, archived at http://perma.cc/FGU6-R99C (explaining why several SCOTUS 
litigators do not believe Justice Scalia is disqualified from hearing the gay marriage cases). 
78 See supra notes 26–51 and accompanying text (citing the initial decision not to 
disqualify). 
79 See supra notes 26–33 and accompanying text (discussing financial and personal 
interests in cases). 
80 See supra notes 33–37 and accompanying text (explaining that jurist’s impartiality may 
be compromised by pre-existing personal relationships with parties vested in the outcome 
of the case). 
81 See supra notes 37–51 and accompanying text (noting the influence of political interests 
or ideologies that could affect a jurist’s impartiality). 
82 See supra notes 42–49 and accompanying text (looking at miscellaneous types of 
personal bias that fall outside the other categories). 
83 See supra notes 26–51 and accompanying text (discussing the tendency to not 
disqualify the jurist for bias). 
84 See supra notes 26–51 and accompanying text (noting that discretion in the 
disqualification decision rested with the jurist in each case). 
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III.  CURRENT SUBSTANTIVE STANDARDS AND PROCEDURAL PRACTICES LEAD 
TO DEFECTIVE “SELF-DISQUALIFICATION” DECISIONS 
The current substantive standards and procedural rules, when 
mixed with the cognitive illusions of the challenged jurist as decision 
maker, create a chancy combination that introduces the risk of systemic 
error in disqualification decisions.  The substantive standards for 
disqualification include actual bias, probable bias, and apparent bias.85  
However, the actual bias standard is seldom applied and instead federal 
and state court decisions focus on the lesser standards of probable or 
apparent bias.86  Both of these standards require the challenged jurist to 
use an objective—not subjective—test to determine if sufficient concerns 
regarding impartiality exist so as to warrant disqualification.87  In most 
instances, the procedural rules permit the challenged jurist to act as the 
initial and, in some cases final, arbiter of his own alleged biases.88  This 
combination sets up a situation in which the challenged jurist evaluates 
his own biases from the perspective of “self” rather than from the 
perspective of the reasonable, informed “other” who is the benchmark 
for the substantive disqualification standard.89  This practice—which can 
                                                 
85 See FLAMM, supra note 76, § 5.2, 103–05.  Although the early common law did not 
permit disqualification for bias (other than in two limited circumstances of pecuniary 
interest and certain prior participation in the proceedings), the current substantive 
standards applicable to the federal and state courts certainly dictate disqualification of a 
jurist who actually is biased. 
86 See FLAMM, supra note 76, §§ 5.1–5.2, 103–08.  Thus, this Article focuses on how the 
Bias Blind Spot affects disqualification decisions using the lesser substantive standards of 
probable or apparent bias.  See infra Part IV (discussing the chancy combination of objective 
standards, self-disqualifying procedures, and the Bias Blind Spot). 
87 See FLAMM, supra note 76, at 104 (stating that the current federal disqualification 
standard is objective).  The term “objective” describes something “existing independent of 
thought or an observer” and “belonging to the object of the thought rather than to the 
thinking subject[.]”  Objective Definition, DICTIONARY.COM, available at http://dictionary. 
reference.com/browse/objective?s=t (last visited Nov. 7, 2014), archived at 
http://perma.cc/6XMA-UZTA (emphasis added).  In contrast, “subjective” describes 
something “existing in the mind [and] belonging to the thinking subject rather than to the 
object of thought.”  Subjective Definition, DICTIONARY.COM, available at 
http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/subjective (last visited Nov. 7, 2014), archived at 
http://perma.cc/6XMA-UZTA (emphasis added).  Thus, as used in this Article, 
“subjective” assessments are made based upon internal evidence of the mental state of the 
challenged jurist—his feelings, opinions, and thoughts—and “objective” assessments are 
made based upon external evidence such as actions and words of the challenged jurist.  See 
infra Part III.A.3–4 (discussing current federal and state substantive standards for 
disqualification). 
88 See infra Part III.A.5 and accompanying text (discussing procedural practices in federal 
and state courts). 
89 See infra Part IV.A and accompanying text (describing how the Bias Blind Spot distorts 
disqualification decisions). 
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be labelled as “self-disqualification”—when combined with the cognitive 
illusion known as the Bias Blind Spot, collapses the objective reasonable 
person test into a subjective self-assessment without the jurist even 
realizing the problem.90  This chancy combination of substantive 
standards, procedural practices, and human fallibility introduces 
systematic error that results in actually, probably, or apparently biased 
jurists deciding cases rather than stepping aside. 
A. Current Federal and State Substantive Standards for Disqualification 
The substantive standards used by the federal and state courts 
require the challenged jurist to use an objective—not subjective—test to 
determine if sufficient concerns regarding impartiality exist to warrant 
disqualification.91  These substantive standards are drawn from three 
types of legal sources:  (1) the Due Process Clause of the United States 
Constitution and some state constitutions; (2) applicable federal and state 
statutes on disqualification; and (3) the relevant federal and state judicial 
ethics codes.92  Each of these sources provides for one of three general 
disqualification standards:  the challenged jurist is disqualified when he 
is actually, probably, or apparently biased.93  All three of these tests 
require consideration of the circumstances from the perspective of the 
reasonable, informed person—an “other” rather than from the “self” 
oriented perspective of the challenged jurist.94  Thus, current federal and 
state substantive law applicable to disqualification decisions requires the 
decision maker to evaluate the evidence of actual, probable, or apparent 
bias as an objective “other” would.  
                                                 
90 See Jeffrey M. Hayes, To Recuse or to Refuse:  Self-Judging and the Reasonable Person 
Problem, 33 J. L. PROF. 85, 96–97 (2008) (labeling this phenomenon as “self-judging”).  But, 
that is a misnomer because, as the author concedes, the jurist who is the target of the 
disqualification motion is not on trial.  Id. at 97.  Moreover, the jurist has no financial or 
other personal interest at stake in the case.  Id. 
91 See infra notes 123–28 and accompanying text (explaining the objective standard). 
92 See Debra L. Bassett & Rex R. Perschbacher, The Elusive Goal of Impartiality, 97 IOWA L. 
REV. 181, 189–90 (2011) [hereinafter The Elusive Goal of Impartiality] (discussing sources of 
disqualification standards).  Of course, these sources do not include State Constitutions, 
several of which include their own Due Process Clause.  See generally Gabriel D. Serbulea, 
Due Process and Judicial Disqualification:  The Need for Reform, 38 PEPP. L. REV. 1109, 1151–73 
(2011) (explaining the recusal laws of the fifty states and the District of Columbia in the 
Appendix). 
93 See supra Part III.A.1–3 (discussing the various substantive standards for 
disqualification under federal and state constitutions, statutes, and judicial codes of 
conduct). 
94 See supra Part III (considering the objective nature of the federal and state substantive 
standards for disqualification). 
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1. Federal Due Process Clause Demands an Objective Evaluation of 
Bias 
The first of these substantive standards, the Due Process Clause of 
the United States Constitution requires an objective assessment of 
whether the jurist is actually or probably biased.95  Historically, SCOTUS 
has interpreted the Due Process Clause to require disqualification in two 
distinct circumstances:  (1) when the jurist has a direct or indirect 
pecuniary interest in the case; and (2) when the jurist has a conflict due 
to his participation in an earlier proceeding (such as when the judge is 
presiding over the trial of a criminal defendant after holding the 
defendant in contempt of court).96  More recently SCOTUS held that 
there is a third instance in which the Due Process Clause requires that 
the challenged jurist step aside.97  In Caperton, a sharply divided SCOTUS 
held that disqualification is warranted “when a person with a personal 
stake in a particular case had a significant and disproportionate 
influence in placing the judge on the case by raising funds or directing 
the judge's election campaign when the case was pending or 
imminent.”98  Thus, the Due Process Clause requires a challenged jurist 
to recuse in at least three different situations, which the Caperton majority 
described as circumstances when “the probability of actual bias on the 
part of the judge or decisionmaker is too high to be constitutionally 
tolerable[.]”99 
                                                 
95 See generally Serbulea, supra note 92, at 1151–72 (listing the state constitutions of 
twelve states that include provisions that have been interpreted to require disqualification 
of judicial officers who are not impartial).  Most of those state constitutional provisions are 
due process clauses.  Id. at 1110–11, 1162–69.  However, a handful of state constitutions—
those adopted in Arkansas, California, Maryland, and Texas—include explicit standards 
for judicial disqualification.  Id. at 1152–53, 1160, 1169–70.  The disqualifying situations 
enumerated in these state constitutions are similar, if not identical, to the disqualifying 
circumstances set forth in the applicable state statutes or judicial ethics rules.  Id. 
96 See Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Lavoie, 475 U.S. 813, 824 (1986) (declaring a judge had a 
direct pecuniary interest in the outcome of the case and should have been disqualified); 
Ward v. Monroeville, 409 U.S. 57, 60–62 (1972) (holding that the village mayor could not act 
as a neutral judge over cases that involved village income); Mayberry v. Pennsylvania, 400 
U.S. 455, 465–66 (1971) (stating that a judge who becomes embroiled in a heated argument 
with the petitioner’s lawyer should not preside over the contempt proceedings); In re 
Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 137–39 (1955) (stating it was a violation of due process for the 
grand jury judge to preside over the subsequent petition); Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 535 
(1927) (stating the defendant had the right to an impartial judge, unmotivated by pecuniary 
interests). 
97 See Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 556 U.S. 868, 884–87 (2009) (noting the risk of 
bias when a significant campaign contributor influences the election to unseat a judge at 
the time they have a case pending before the court). 
98 Id. at 884. 
99 Id. at 868 (quoting Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35, 47 (1975)). 
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It is clear from both the language and holding in Caperton that the 
“probability of actual bias” standard requires an objective evaluation of 
the external evidence of bias in order to comply with Due Process.100  
First, Justice Kennedy explains the prior SCOTUS precedents make clear 
that “[t]he inquiry is an objective one.”101  Second, the majority opinion 
states that actual subjective bias is not required to merit 
disqualification—a serious risk of bias is sufficient:  “[t]he Court asks not 
whether the judge is actually, subjectively biased, but whether the 
average judge in his position is ‘likely’ to be neutral, or whether there is 
an unconstitutional ‘potential for bias.’”102  Third, the Caperton Court 
spells out that the disqualification determination does not depend on the 
challenged jurist’s assessment of his own thoughts, opinions, or feelings 
but relies on external evidence of how the average jurist would respond 
in the circumstances:  “the question is whether, ‘under a realistic 
appraisal of psychological tendencies and human weakness,’ the interest 
‘poses such a risk of actual bias or prejudgment that the practice must be 
forbidden if the guarantee of due process is to be adequately 
implemented.’” 103  Thus, the Due Process standard is not concerned with 
the internal evidence of actual bias known only to the challenged jurist, 
but requires assessment of whether there is a probability of judicial bias 
as viewed from an objective perspective held by somebody else—a 
reasonable “other.”104 
While this guarantee of judicial impartiality means that the Due 
Process Clause is exceedingly important in some respects—it is, in 
                                                 
100 Id. at 872. 
101 Id. at 881. 
102 Id. at 881. 
103 Caperton, 556 U.S. at 870 (quoting Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35, 46 (1975)).  In the 
facts before the Caperton Court, “[t]he inquiry center[ed] on the contribution's relative size 
in comparison to the total amount of money contributed to the campaign, the total amount 
spent in the election, and the apparent effect such contribution had on the outcome of the 
election.”  Id. at 884. 
104 See id. at 896 (noting the dissent’s concern regarding the ambiguity of the 
reasonableness standard used by the majority).  One thing that the Caperton majority did 
not answer is whether that “other” is “a reasonable [lay]person, a reasonable lawyer, or a 
reasonable judge[.]”  Id. (Roberts, J., dissenting).  Some commentators have posited that the 
Due Process Clause, unlike the federal and state statutes and judicial rules, requires the 
assessment of probable bias be made by a “reasonable judge” rather than a reasonable 
layperson.  See, e.g., Raymond J. McKoski, Judicial Disqualification After Caperton v. A.T. 
Massey Coal Company:  What’s Due Process Got To Do With It?, 63 BAYLOR L. REV. 368, 388–
91 (2011) (stating that the average judge who is skilled in the art of judging is best suited to 
determine whether a jurist is likely to be tempted to ignore his oath, training, and 
professional obligations when deciding a case); Dmitry Bam, Understanding Caperton:  
Judicial Disqualification Under the Due Process Clause, 42 MCGEORGE L. REV. 65, 75 (2010) 
(concluding that the ABA appearance-based disqualification test is administered by a 
“member of the public,” while the due process test focuses on the reasonable judge). 
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practice, the least important standard for judicial disqualification.  It is 
the most important source of judicial disqualification law because the 
Due Process Clause embodies an ideal and guarantees “[a] fair trial in a 
fair tribunal” to all litigants who appear before any court in the United 
States—whether a federal or state tribunal.105  The Fifth Amendment 
insures that Due Process is provided in the federal courts and the Due 
Process guarantee is made applicable to the state courts through the 
Fourteenth Amendment.106  Nevertheless, “[t]he Due Process Clause 
demarks only the outer boundaries of judicial disqualifications.  
Congress and the states, of course, [already have been and] remain free 
to impose more rigorous standards for judicial disqualification than 
those we find mandated [by the Due Process Clause].”107  Thus, even 
though the Due Process Clause applies to every federal and state court it 
seldom will be the basis for disqualification—instead most 
disqualification disputes will be resolved by applying other applicable 
non-constitutional federal or state laws. 
2. Non-Constitutional Disqualification Law Requires an Objective 
Assessment of Bias 
The non-constitutional sources of disqualification law vary 
somewhat in specific aspects of the substantive test employed, but nearly 
all apply an objective standard when assessing judicial bias.  While there 
may be other mechanisms to remove a jurist, the primary non-
constitutional sources of disqualification law include applicable federal 
and state statutes and the rules governing judicial conduct in both 
federal and state courts.108  In the federal courts, Title 28 of the United 
States Code provides the statutory authority for parties to seek 
disqualification of a jurist who actually is biased or appears to be less 
than impartial.109  In the state courts, disqualification is also governed, in 
part, by statutory law as nearly every state—with only two exceptions—
has adopted a disqualification statute.110  While a substantial minority of 
states permits parties to use some form of peremptory challenge to 
                                                 
105 Caperton, 556 U.S. at 876 (quoting In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 136 (1955)). 
106 See id. at 872 (stating the analysis is based on the Fourteenth Amendment in this case). 
107 Id. at 889–90 (quoting Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Lavoie, 475 U.S. 813, 828 (1986)). 
108 See generally FLAMM, supra note 76, at 30–50 (discussing the basis for disqualification 
provisions). 
109 See generally id. at 669–81 (describing all the amendments that have been made to Title 
28 of the United States Code in regard to disqualification provisions). 
110 See Serbulea, supra note 92, at 1122 & n.104 (noting that Delaware and New 
Hampshire are the two exceptions); see also, FLAMM, supra note 76, at 753 (explaining that 
there are statutes, constitutional provisions, or court rules in nearly every state dealing 
with judicial disqualification). 
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disqualify a jurist, most state statutes generally require that a jurist step 
aside when he is actually biased or his impartiality might reasonably be 
questioned.111  Given that both federal and state statutes embody an 
appearance of impartiality standard, it is not surprising that a challenged 
jurist’s actual or potential for bias must be assessed using an objective 
standard. 
3. Federal Statutory Substantive Disqualification Standards Apply the 
Reasonable Person Test 
In the federal courts, that objective assessment can be made under 28 
U.S.C. §§ 47, 144, or 455, but section 455 is the statute that, in practice, 
governs most federal disqualification disputes.112  Unlike 28 U.S.C. § 455, 
sections 47 & 144 of Title 28 are rarely used as the basis for a motion to 
disqualify.113  Section 47 has a very narrow focus and disqualifies a judge 
only from “hear[ing] or determin[ing] an appeal from the decision of a 
case or issue tried by him [previously].”114  Section 144 also is limited in 
scope because it applies only to “proceeding[s] in a district court” and 
not to any federal appellate court.115  However, section 144 should be 
widely used at least in district court because the intent and language of 
the statute suggests that Congress intended to provide parties with the 
right to use a peremptory challenge to disqualify a trial judge whom the 
party believed to be biased or prejudiced.116  Notwithstanding this 
language, federal courts have interpreted and applied section 144 in such 
a way as to render its provisions virtually meaningless.117  Thus, most 
federal court challenges to a jurist’s impartiality that rely upon statutory 
law generally are brought under 28 U.S.C. § 455. 
In contrast to both section 47 and section 144, section 455 is designed 
to apply broadly and, by its terms, governs disqualification in all federal 
                                                 
111 See Serbulea, supra note 92, at 1123 & n.108 (noting that Arizona, Iowa, Louisiana, 
Michigan, and South Carolina are the minority of states); see also, FLAMM, supra note 76, at 
753 (stating that the most significant difference among state disqualification laws is that 
while in a majority of jurisdictions judges may be removed only for cause, a substantial 
minority of states permit parties to use peremptory challenges to remove a jurist). 
112 See Serbulea, supra note 92, at 1121 (citing to the relevant federal disqualification 
statutes). 
113 See id. at 1125–26 (providing reasoning as to why sections 47 and 144 of Title 28 are 
rarely used). 
114 28 U.S.C. § 47 (2006). 
115 Id. § 144. 
116 See Debra Lyn Bassett, Judicial Disqualification in the Federal Appellate Courts, 87 IOWA L. 
REV. 1213, 1223–26 (analyzing Congress’s intended use of the statute). 
117 See id. at 1224–25 & n.58 (citing to examples of federal cases). 
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courts at both the trial and appellate level.118  Under subpart (a) of 
section 455, a federal court jurist “shall disqualify himself in any 
proceeding in which his impartiality might reasonably be questioned.”119  
This standard has been interpreted to require disqualification “when a 
reasonable person, knowing the relevant facts” would believe the jurist 
may be biased and it does not require a showing of subjective bias.120  
This general disqualification standard is augmented in subpart (b) of 
section 455 by a list of specific circumstances, which per se constitutes 
disqualifying conditions.121  The current language of both parts of section 
                                                 
118 See CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS, SUPREME COURT OF THE U.S., 2011 YEAR-END REPORT ON 
THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY 7 (Dec. 31, 2011), available at http://www.supremecourt.gov/ 
publicinfo/year-end/2011year-endreport.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/2PGR-UKQV 
[hereinafter 2011 YEAR-END REPORT ON THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY] (stating that “the limits of 
Congress’s power to require recusal [of SCOTUS Justices] ha[s] never been tested”).  In 
spite of the clear language used by Congress, SCOTUS has never acknowledged, much less 
held, that section 255 applies to disqualification of the Justices of SCOTUS.  Id.  In fact, 
Chief Justice Roberts recently released a Year End Report that suggested Congress may not 
have the power to regulate disqualification disputes and other ethical matters involving 
SCOTUS.  Id.  However, section 455 is widely used in the district courts and circuit courts 
of appeal.  Id. 
119 28 U.S.C. § 455(a) (2006). 
120 See Liljeberg v. Health Serv. Acquisition Corp., 486 U.S. 847, 848 (1988) (holding that if 
a reasonable person, knowing the relevant facts as they actually existed, would believe that 
the judge should have known of the conflict, then the judge may be retroactively 
disqualified under section 455). 
121 28 U.S.C. § 455(b) (2006).  In fact, section 455(b) mandates that a federal jurist:   
[S]hall also disqualify himself in the following circumstances:   
(1) Where he has a personal bias or prejudice concerning a party, or 
personal knowledge of disputed evidentiary facts concerning the 
proceeding; 
(2) Where in private practice he served as lawyer in the matter in 
controversy, or a lawyer with whom he previously practiced law 
served during such association as a lawyer concerning the matter, or 
the judge or such lawyer has been a material witness concerning it; 
(3) Where he has served in governmental employment and in such 
capacity participated as counsel, adviser or material witness 
concerning the proceeding or expressed an opinion concerning the 
merits of the particular case in controversy; 
(4) He knows that he, individually or as a fiduciary, or his spouse or 
minor child residing in his household, has a financial interest in the 
subject matter in controversy or in a party to the proceeding, or any 
other interest that could be substantially affected by the outcome of the 
proceeding; 
(5) He or his spouse, or a person within the third degree of relationship 
to either of them, or the spouse of such a person:   
(i) Is a party to the proceeding, or an officer, director, or trustee of 
a party; 
(ii) Is acting as a lawyer in the proceeding; 
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455 includes the term “shall” to make clear the jurist has no discretion 
and must recuse if the conditions set forth in either subpart are met—
regardless of the jurist’s thoughts, feelings, or opinions.122  Thus, both 
sections of section 455 provide legal standards that employ an objective 
test—not one based upon the jurist’s subjective view—for determining 
whether disqualification is required. 
4. State Substantive Disqualification Statutes are Based Upon Objective 
Standards 
Like the federal statutory scheme, most state disqualification statutes 
require application of an objective test to determine if sufficient bias does 
or at least appears to exist to warrant the jurist stepping down.  
Although a minority of states permit some form of peremptory 
challenge, most limit that right to one challenge per party per case, so 
any party that desires to disqualify any substituted jurist must meet the 
applicable “for cause” standard.123  The disqualification standards 
provided in twenty-nine of the statutes adopted in the fifty states can be 
broken down into two categories:  (1) five states require a showing of 
                                                                                                             
(iii) Is known by the judge to have an interest that could be 
substantially affected by the outcome of the proceeding; 
(iv) Is to the judge’s knowledge likely to be a material witness in 
the proceeding. 
Id. 
122 28 U.S.C. § 455 (1970).  Before its amendment in 1974, Section 455 provided for a 
subjective test for determining whether disqualification was warranted:   
Any justice or judge of the United States shall disqualify himself in any 
case in which he has a substantial interest, has been of counsel, is or 
has been a material witness, or is so related to or connected with any 
party or his attorney as to render it improper, in his opinion, for him to 
sit on the trial, appeal, or other proceeding therein. 
Id. (emphasis added); see also Barry Sullivan, Law and Discretion in Supreme Court Recusals:  
A Response to Professor Lubet, 47 VAL. U. L. REV. 907, 919–20 (suggesting the possibility that 
§ 455 may be unconstitutional as applied, but “it seems unlikely that a majority of the 
Justices would want to provoke a constitutional stand-off over the question whether 
Congress has the right to insist that the Justices act with the same degree of probity as other 
federal judges.”). 
123 See Serbulea, supra note 92, at 1122–23 & n.105 (discussing state disqualification 
statutes and noting that only seventeen states allow for peremptory disqualification 
without cause); see also JAMES SAMPLE ET AL., BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST., FAIR COURTS:  
SETTING RECUSAL STANDARDS 18 (2008), available at http://www.brennancenter.org/ 
sites/default/files/legacy/Democracy/Recusal%20Paper_FINAL.pdf, archived at 
http://www.perma.cc/M2AD-8CSZ (explaining that about one third of the states, a total 
of nineteen, permit parties to use peremptory challenges to remove one judge per 
proceeding); FLAMM, supra note 76, at 790 (stating that “a substantial minority of mostly 
western or mid-western jurisdictions have provisions on the books that permit parties to 
seek disqualification on a peremptory basis, without any showing of cause”). 
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actual bias; and (2) twenty-four states require disqualification upon a 
showing of at least an appearance of partiality.124  However, the 
statutory law in the remaining twenty-one states is not easily grouped 
into a single classification—though all appear to require evidence of 
something less than actual bias.125  The “appearance of impropriety” or 
“appearance of partiality” test asks the decision maker to evaluate the 
evidence of possible bias in the same manner a reasonable [and 
informed] “other” would—which requires that he view the external 
evidence of possible bias.126  In other words, the majority of state 
disqualification statutes that have a clear standard employ an objective 
test and do not rely upon the jurist’s subjective thoughts, feelings, or 
opinion about his own actual, probable, or apparent bias. 
5. Federal and State Codes of Judicial Conduct Rely on the “Reasonable 
Other” Standard to Evaluate Bias 
In addition to the statutory grounds for disqualification, federal and 
state court judges and justices (with the possible exception of SCOTUS) 
are subject to ethical rules that require assessment of judicial bias using 
an objective assessment of the external evidence.127  The Code of Conduct 
for United States Judges  (“Code of Conduct for US Judges”) adopted by the 
Judicial Conference of the United States is the touchstone for 
determining whether the circumstances create an “appearance of 
impropriety” that dictate whether the federal jurist should step aside and 
not hear a case.128  The ABA Model Code of Judicial Conduct (“ABA Judicial 
Code”) provides the benchmark for disqualification in state court 
systems, having been adopted in substantial part in at least forty-nine 
states.129  It is not clear that either of these ethical codes has the force of 
                                                 
124 See Serbulea, supra note 92, at 1123 & n.108 (noting the five states are Arizona, Iowa, 
Louisiana, Michigan, and South Carolina).  See generally FLAMM, supra note 76, at 790–822 
(listing only eighteen states that permit some form of peremptory challenge that requires 
no showing of cause). 
125 See Serbulea, supra note 92, at 1123 (recognizing that the law is unclear in the rest of 
the states); see also FLAMM, supra note 76, at 104–07 (stating the “appearance of impropriety” 
or “appearance of bias” standards are both objective assessments). 
126 See FLAMM, supra note 76, at 107 (stating that all states—except Iowa, Louisiana, 
Michigan, and Wisconsin—have adopted the “appearance of bias” standard and held it 
requires the challenged jurist to step aside “whenever a reasonable person would think [the 
jurist] might not be absolutely detached and impartial”). 
127 See 2011 YEAR-END REPORT ON THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY, supra note 118, at 7 (stating 
that “the limits of Congress’s power to require recusal [of SCOTUS Justices] have never 
been tested”). 
128 Bassett, supra note 116, at 1229. 
129 See id. (noting adoption of a version of the ABA Judicial Code in all forty-nine states); 
Marie McManus Degnan, Note, No Actual Bias Needed:  The Intersection of Due Process and 
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law—the ABA Judicial Code being merely a model code and there being 
some question regarding the statutory authority of the Judicial 
Conference to enact binding ethics rules for jurists.130  Nevertheless, the 
ethical standards expressed in both the ABA Judicial Code and the Code of 
Conduct of US Judges are given great deference by courts when deciding 
disqualification disputes.131  Thus, both of these judicial conduct codes 
have a significant impact on disqualification decisions throughout the 
federal and state court systems. 
a. State Codes of Judicial Conduct Apply an Objective Appearance-Based 
Standard 
There are two basic scenarios under the ABA Judicial Code that dictate 
a jurist must not sit on a case:  (1) when he actually is not impartial; or 
(2) when it appears to a reasonable person that he might not be 
impartial.132  Both standards are set forth in Rule 2.11 of the ABA Judicial 
Code, which is the operative provision for judicial disqualification.133  The 
first part of Rule 2.11(a) provides that “[a] judge shall disqualify himself 
or herself in a proceeding in which the judge’s impartiality might 
reasonably be questioned[.]”134  The second part of Rule 2.11(a) includes 
six enumerated disqualifying situations that require a jurist to step aside 
when: 
(1) the judge has a personal bias against a party or 
lawyer or the judge has personal knowledge of the 
facts of the proceeding; 
(2) the judge or his spouse, parent, or child has an 
economic interest in the outcome of the litigation; 
(3) the judge, his spouse, or his close family member is 
a party, trustee or officer to a party, lawyer, a 
                                                                                                             
Statutory Recusal, 83 TEMPLE L. REV. 225, 227 & n.20 (2010) (noting adoption of Rule 2.11 in 
substantial part in all fifty states). 
130 Bassett, supra note 116, at 1229–30 & n.79.  Of course, the ABA Judicial Code, being a 
model code does not have the force of law unless and until it is properly adopted in a 
jurisdiction.  Id. at 1229.  The 1972 version of ABA Model Code has been adopted in at least 
forty-nine of the fifty states.  Id.  While some states treat their judicial codes of conduct as 
enforceable rules of law other states that have adopted the ABA Judicial Code treat the 
standards as guidelines for ethical judicial behavior.  Id. at n.79. 
131 See id. at 1229 (noting that the states differ with respect to the power of these ethical 
rules). 
132 See MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT R. 2.11 cmt. 1 (2004) (discussing the two 
scenarios referenced in the Code). 
133 See id. (providing an overview of Rule 2.11). 
134 MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT R. 2.11 (2004) (reflecting the concept formally 
found in Canon 3E). 
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material witness, or has an interest substantially 
affected by the proceeding; 
(4) the judge knows or learns from a timely filed motion 
that one of the parties has made campaign 
contributions of a certain size and within a specific 
time frame; 
(5) the judge has made public statements that appear to 
commit the judge to an issue in the case; or 
(6) the judge previously was involved in the case as a 
lawyer, public official, material witness, or presided 
over the matter in another court.135 
While these six specific situations listed in Rule 2.11(a)(1)–(6) are 
intended to “cover most of the situations in which disqualification is 
likely to arise,” the enumerated circumstances are not an exhaustive 
list.136  In addition, the specific enumerated scenarios are not a substitute 
for the general disqualification standard set forth in Rule 2.11, which is 
an independent basis for disqualification.137  Thus, there are two 
standards under Rule 2.11—the list of per se disqualifying conditions and 
the general disqualification standard that is invoked when the facts do 
not fit within one of the six per se rules, but the judge’s impartiality 
nevertheless might reasonably be questioned.138 
While there are two standards embodied within Rule 2.11, the 
language of the rule makes clear that if either test is met, the jurist 
                                                 
135 Id. at 19.  Not all states have adopted all of the enumerated disqualifying 
circumstances.  See Degnan, supra note 129, at 227 (noting that all fifty states have adopted 
the rule in substantial part).  In fact, the rule requiring disqualification based upon 
campaign contributions by interested parties has been adopted in only one state.  Id. at 228 
& n. 27. 
136 E. WAYNE THODE, REPORTER’S NOTES TO CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT 60 (1973).  The 
notes provide that: 
Although the specific standards cover most of the situations in which 
the disqualification issue will arise, the general standard should not be 
overlooked.  Any conduct that would lead a reasonable [person] 
knowing all the circumstances to the conclusion that the judge’s 
“impartiality might reasonably be questioned” is a basis for the judge’s 
disqualification. 
Id. 
137 See MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT R. 2.11 cmt. 1 (2007) (“Under this Rule, a judge 
is disqualified whenever the judge’s impartiality might reasonably be questioned, 
regardless of whether any of the specific provisions of paragraphs (A)(1) through (6) 
apply.”). 
138 See MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT R. 2.11 cmt. 1 (2004) (stating that a jurist is 
disqualified “whenever the judge’s impartiality might reasonably be questioned, regardless 
of whether any of the specific provisions of paragraphs (A)(1) through (6) apply.”). 
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“shall” step aside.139  The original version of this rule did not include the 
term “shall” but rather indicated that the challenged jurist “should” step 
aside in the disqualifying situations.140  This change in language (which 
actually was made throughout the ABA Judicial Code) signaled a change 
to a mandatory rule—rather than a discretionary standard.141  This 
change in the language from “should” to “shall” has been adopted in a 
majority of states and, therefore, these provisions are deemed mandatory 
in those jurisdictions as well.142  In addition, the majority of states that 
had adopted the precursor to Rule 2.11 had already interpreted and 
applied the “should disqualify” language to require recusal.143  Thus, in 
every state that adopted a standard based upon the ABA Judicial Code, if 
either the general standard is met or one of the specific situations exists, 
the disqualification decision is not discretionary. 
In addition to being mandatory, both the general and specific 
standards for disqualification under the ABA Judicial Code require an 
objective rather than subjective assessment of the jurist’s impartiality.  
The first disqualification standard—when the “judge’s impartiality 
might reasonably be questioned”—is evaluated not from the perspective 
of the challenged jurist but from the point of view of a reasonable 
person—that hypothetical “other” in the law.144  Likewise, the 
assessment of judicial impartiality under the second disqualification 
standard—the per se rules—requires evaluation of external facts 
measured from an objective perspective not the subjective state of mind 
of the challenged jurist.145  Moreover, the comments to the ABA Judicial 
                                                 
139 See Leslie W. Abramson, Appearance of Impropriety:  Deciding When a Judge’s Impartiality 
“Might Reasonably Be Questioned,” 14 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 55, 57–58 (2000) (noting that 
“shall” was substituted for “should” when the ABA Judicial Code was amended in 1990).  
In 1990, the term “should” was replaced with the currently used “shall” in all the canons 
and rules making the provisions of the ABA Judicial Code mandatory.  Id. at 58. 
140 See id. at 57 (referring to the original version of Rule 2.11). 
141 See id. at 58 (discussing the change in the language of Rule 2.11 to include the word 
“shall”). 
142 See id. at n.13 (noting that of the forty-nine states that have adopted the ABA Judicial 
Code only sixteen still use the term “should” in their version of the rules). 
143 See id. at 57 n.12 (providing an example of a South Dakota case where “should” was 
not mandatory). 
144 See Abramson, supra note 139, at 58–59 (explaining that the challenged jurist’s 
subjective evaluation of the potentially disqualifying circumstances will differ from the 
assessment a reasonable other would make of the same situation). 
145 See id. at 59–60 (evaluating individual facts).  For example, the decision maker must 
evaluate whether the jurist previously played a particular role in the case, if the jurist or a 
related person has a known direct or indirect economic interest in the case, or whether the 
jurist or related party may be a material witness.  See also MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL 
CONDUCT R. 2.11(A)–(C) (2007) (providing rules for when a judge must disqualify himself 
from a proceeding). 
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Code make clear the reference point is the reasonable minds of others—
not the challenged jurist:  “[t]he test for appearance of impropriety is 
whether the conduct would create in reasonable minds a perception that 
the judge violated this Code or engaged in other conduct that reflects 
adversely on the judge's honesty, impartiality, temperament, or fitness to 
serve as a judge.”146  Thus, regardless of whether disqualification is 
based upon the six enumerated per se circumstances or the “might 
reasonably be questioned” catch-all provision, the evaluation of 
partiality under the ABA Judicial Code, which has been adopted in nearly 
all the states, embodies an objective standard that relies on external 
evidence of bias. 
b. Federal Code of Judicial Conduct Applies a Similar Objective Standard 
The standard for judicial disqualification contained in the Code of 
Conduct for US Judges is virtually indistinguishable from the standard in 
the ABA Judicial Code.147  In fact, the two Codes employ nearly identical 
language for both the enumerated situations in which bias is presumed 
and the general based disqualification standards.148  There are only two 
differences in these two substantive standards for judicial 
disqualification.149  First, the Code of Conduct for US Judges does not 
include in its listing of enumerated per se disqualifying circumstances 
any reference to the jurist’s personal bias or prejudice concerning a 
party’s lawyer as is included in Rule 2.11 of the ABA Judicial Code.150  
Second, although the Code of Conduct for US Judges requires 
disqualification when the jurist and certain related persons have any 
“interest[s] that could be substantially affected by the outcome of the 
proceeding,” this standard omits the “de minimis” qualifier that is 
included in the ABA Judicial Code.151  Otherwise, the language of the two 
judicial codes of conduct defining disqualification standards is identical 
and these provisions closely correspond to the substantive standards of 
                                                 
146 MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT R. 1.2 cmt. 5 (2007). 
147 CODE OF CONDUCT FOR UNITED STATES JUDGES Canon 3C(1)(a) (2009); MODEL CODE OF 
JUDICIAL CONDUCT R. 2.11 (2007). 
148 See Bassett, supra note 116, at 1230–32 (describing the similarities between the Code of 
Conduct for United States Judges and the ABA Model Code of Judicial Conduct). 
149 See id. at 1231 (stating the two differences in the Codes). 
150 Compare CODE OF CONDUCT FOR UNITED STATES JUDGES Canon 3C(1)(a) (2009) 
(neglecting to include a detailed reference to personal bias toward a lawyer presenting the 
case), with MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT R. 2.11(A)(1) (2011) (including bias toward a 
lawyer presenting the case as a disqualifying factor). 
151 Compare CODE OF CONDUCT FOR UNITED STATES JUDGES Canon 3C(1)(d)(iii) (2009) 
(indicating that an interest must be “substantially affected” by the proceeding’s outcome to 
determine bias), with MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT R. 2.11(A)(2)(c) (2011) (stating 
that the person’s bias must have more than a “de minimis” effect on the outcome). 
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section 455.152  Given these similarities in language, the Code of Conduct 
for US Judges—like the ABA Judicial Code—mandates disqualification of a 
jurist when there is objective evidence that the challenged jurist’s 
impartiality might reasonably be questioned by an informed “other” or 
the per se disqualifying circumstances are present. 
The use of an objective test for disqualification is in keeping with the 
underlying purposes of the ABA Judicial Code and the Code of Conduct for 
US Judges.  The ABA Judicial Code emphasizes the importance of ensuring 
fairness in the courts by ensuring both actual impartiality and perceived 
impartiality.153  The appearance of an impartiality standard also 
promotes public confidence in the courts, which is seen as integral to the 
proper workings of the judicial system and society as a whole.154  
Similarly, the Code of Conduct for US Judges requires judges to avoid the 
appearance of impropriety and “to act in a manner that promotes public 
confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary.”155  The need 
to act appropriately is not limited to when a judge discharges his judicial 
duties, rather he must “avoid all impropriety and appearance of 
impropriety” throughout his professional and personal life to promote 
public confidence in the judiciary.156  Thus, both the ABA Judicial Code 
                                                 
152 See 28 U.S.C. § 455 (2012) (governing the conduct of judges and when they should 
recuse themselves).  Compare CODE OF CONDUCT FOR UNITED STATES JUDGES Canon 
3C(1)(d)(iii) (2009) (containing the same language for disqualification as the Model Code of 
Judicial Conduct except it omits the reference to “de minimis” interests), with MODEL CODE 
OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT R. 2.11(A)(2)(c) (2011) (using the same language for disqualification 
as the Code of Conduct for US Judges with the addition of a “de minimis” standard). 
153 See MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 1 (2011) (“A judge shall uphold and 
promote the independence, integrity, and impartiality of the judiciary, and shall avoid 
impropriety and the appearance of impropriety.”). 
154 See MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT, Preamble (2011) (introducing the role of the 
judiciary and the need for impartiality).  The Preamble provides: 
An independent, fair and impartial judiciary is indispensable to our 
system of justice.  The United States legal system is based upon the 
principle that an independent, impartial, and competent judiciary, 
composed of men and women of integrity, will interpret and apply the 
law that governs our society.  Thus, the judiciary plays a central role in 
preserving the principles of justice and the rule of law. Inherent in all 
the Rules contained in this Code are the precepts that judges, 
individually and collectively, must respect and honor the judicial office 
as a public trust and strive to maintain and enhance confidence in the 
legal system. 
Id. 
155 CODE OF CONDUCT FOR UNITED STATES JUDGES Canon 3 (2009). 
156 CODE OF CONDUCT FOR UNITED STATES JUDGES Canon 2 (2009).  The Commentary 
explains: 
Public confidence in the judiciary is eroded by irresponsible or 
improper conduct by judges.  A judge must avoid all impropriety and 
appearance of impropriety.  This prohibition applies to both 
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and the Code of Conduct for US Judges properly apply an objective test to 
determine whether a jurist is not only actually impartial, but has 
maintained the appearance of impartiality at all times. 
B. Federal and State Substantive Standards Rely on an Objective Assessment 
of Bias to Promote Purposes of Impartiality 
The substantive standards for judicial disqualification used in the 
federal and state courts—whether based upon the Constitution, a statute, 
or code of ethics—employ an objective test for determining judicial bias.  
Using an objective substantive standard to determine judicial bias makes 
sense once we properly understand the primary purposes of 
disqualification—actual impartiality to safeguard the litigant’s right to a 
fair trial and the appearance of impartiality to promote public confidence 
in the courts.157  The use of an objective standard focused on external 
evidence of the challenged jurist’s words and deeds in assessing actual, 
probable, or apparent bias is necessary.  This objective and externally 
focused standard is critical to measuring how a reasonable “other” 
would view the situation, which is required for the appearance of bias 
standard.158  Also, the use of a subjective standard in assessing probable 
bias would be improper because we cannot detect non-conscious bias by 
examining the internal evidence—the challenged jurist’s thoughts, 
feelings and opinions.159  While a subjective standard for determining 
actual bias may suffice when the bias is conscious, only an objective 
standard can adequately address non-conscious actual bias.160  Thus, the 
                                                                                                             
professional and personal conduct.  A judge must expect to be the 
subject of constant public scrutiny and accept freely and willingly 
restrictions that might be viewed as burdensome by the ordinary 
citizen. 
Id. 
157 See The Dimensions of Judicial Impartiality, supra note 21, at 513–14 (discussing the 
primary purposes underlying the rule of impartiality in the context of disqualification as 
protecting individual rights to a fair trial in specific cases and creating confidence in the 
legal system generally).  However, at least one commentator has suggested that Due 
Process Clause based disqualification standards need only avoid actual bias and that 
concerns regarding the public’s confidence in the courts are overblown and could be 
properly addressed by simply requiring jurists to provide adequate explanations of their 
reasons for disqualification decisions.  See also Sarah M.R. Cravens, In Pursuit of Actual 
Justice, 59 ALA. L. REV. 1, 42–43 (2007) (analyzing other proposals). 
158 See supra Part III.B (discussing the use of extrospective evidence to assess bias in 
others). 
159 See infra Part IV.A.3 (discussing the use of introspective evidence to assess bias in self). 
160 See Pub. Util. Comm. of D.C. v. Pollak, 343 U.S. 451, 466–67 (1952) (Frankfurter, J., 
concurring) (finding that the subconscious may lead to biased decision making).  The most 
notable instance of a jurist stepping down due to actual bias happened when Justice 
Frankfurter recused himself from hearing a case challenging the practice of playing the 
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applicable substantive standard must use an objective standard to 
protect litigants’ rights by preventing actually biased jurists from hearing 
litigants’ cases and maintain public confidence in the judiciary by 
avoiding either the probability of partiality or the appearance of 
impartiality. 
C. Federal and Most State Courts Use Self-Disqualification 
While the federal and state courts use different procedures when 
determining disqualification disputes, most of those procedures have 
one flaw in common:  they allow “self-disqualification.”161  The current 
procedures in all federal courts permit the challenged jurist to make the 
initial determination of whether he is, probably is, or appears to be 
sufficiently biased to warrant disqualification.162  Although most of those 
decisions (other than at SCOTUS) are subject to some form of appellate 
review, the costs to litigants of pursuing an appeal and the lenient 
standard of review makes it unlikely that an incorrect initial decision will 
be corrected.  The same problems plague the state courts, despite the 
availability of limited rights to peremptory challenges in a minority of 
states, most state courts use procedures that empower the challenged 
jurist to decide disqualification disputes.163  Thus, in both the federal and 
state courts most often the challenged jurist is tasked with being 
unbiased about his own biases and there is no meaningful appellate 
review. 
1. Disqualification Procedures Under the Federal Constitution, 
Statutes, and Ethical Rules 
The three sources of the disqualification substantive standards most 
often used in federal court—the U.S. Constitution, the applicable federal 
                                                                                                             
radio on public buses because his feelings were “so strongly engaged as a victim of the 
practice in controversy” it was better for him “not [to] participate in judicial judgment 
upon it.”  Id. at 467.  Justice Frankfurter further stated his belief that most judges can, given 
their judicial “training, professional habits, [and] self-discipline[,]” set aside their feelings 
and judge impartially; however, Justice Frankfurter also stated that he worried that his 
“unconscious feelings” on the subject were so strong they might operate on a sub-conscious 
level and affect the outcome or—at the very least—“unfairly lead others to believe they are 
[so] operating.”  Id. at 466–67.  Thus, he took no part in consideration of the case.  Id. at 467. 
161 See Hayes, supra note 90, at 96–97 (discussing fact that most federal and state court 
procedures permit a challenged jurist to be the judge in his own disqualification cause and 
labeling the phenomenon as “self-disqualification”). 
162 See 28 U.S.C. § 455 (2012) (providing guidance on how jurists should determine 
whether their bias will influence a case). 
163 See FLAMM, supra note 76, at 753–56 (distinguishing the state court procedures for 
disqualification from federal practices). 
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disqualification statutes, and the code of conduct that applies to federal 
jurists—either require or permit a challenged jurist to make the initial 
disqualification decision.164  The Due Process Clause itself does not 
specify any procedures for how a disqualification dispute is to be 
determined, but SCOTUS has consistently held that it is proper for the 
challenged jurist to make the initial disqualification decision.165  
Although the language of 28 U.S.C. § 144 appears to provide for a 
peremptory disqualification, the statute added procedural hurdles.166  
Additionally, the manner in which the statute has been consistently 
applied by federal jurists has transformed section 144 into a 
discretionary disqualification mechanism and rendered it ineffectual.167  
The language of the most frequently used federal statute, 28 U.S.C. § 455 
expressly provides that the challenged jurist shall decide whether the 
grounds for disqualification are satisfied.168  Similarly, the Code of 
Conduct for U.S. Judges provides a self-enforcing disqualification standard 
that leaves the challenged jurist in charge of the disqualification 
decision.169  Thus, regardless of the substantive standard used in a 
federal court disqualification dispute, the judge or justice who is 
                                                 
164 See The Elusive Goal of Impartiality, supra note 92, at 196 (discussing sources of federal 
disqualification standards).   
165 See U.S. CONST. art. V (quoting “[n]o person shall . . . be deprived of life, liberty, or 
property without due process . . . .”); see, e.g., Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 556 U.S. 
868, 882 (2009) (noting that the challenged state supreme court justice decided all four 
disqualification motions filed against him and suggesting that procedure was proper).  
“Following accepted principles of our legal tradition respecting the proper performance of 
judicial functions, judges often inquire into their subjective motives and purposes in the 
ordinary course of deciding a case.”  Id.  Indeed, the Caperton Court missed the perfect 
opportunity to correct this flawed disqualification procedure—but instead chose to focus 
on the substance of the decision made by Justice Benjamin who repeatedly failed to 
appreciate how the facts applied to the proper objective standard dictated by state law.  See 
also Marbes, supra note 164, at 269–70 (explaining the reasons Caperton argued to dismiss 
Justice Benjamin); Bassett & Perschbacher, supra note 92, at 193 (illustrating the impact of 
Caperton on the study of judicial impartiality). 
166 See 28 U.S.C. § 144 (2012) (adding procedural requirements including a deadline for 
filing an affidavit of facts and a certificate of good faith from counsel). 
167 See id. (regulating the bias and prejudice of judges); see also FLAMM, supra note 76, at 
695–96 (describing the application of the strict construction of 28 U.S.C. § 144). 
168 See 28 U.S.C. § 445(a)–(b) (stating that “(a) Any justice, judge, or magistrate judge of 
the United States shall disqualify himself in any proceeding in which his impartiality might 
reasonably be questioned.  (b) He shall also disqualify himself in [any of the six enumerated] 
circumstances . . . [.]” (emphasis added)). 
169 See CODE OF CONDUCT FOR UNITED STATES JUDGES Canon 3(C)(1) (2009) (giving the 
judge the power to decide his or her own personal bias).  “A judge shall disqualify himself 
or herself in a proceeding in which the judge’s impartiality might reasonably be 
questioned, including but not limited to instances in which [one of the six per se 
circumstances exist].”  Id. 
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believed to be actually, probably, or apparently biased is empowered to 
make that critical decision. 
2. Disqualification Procedures Under the State Constitution, Statutes, 
and Ethical Rules 
Similarly, in most state court proceedings—whether decided under a 
state constitutional provision, statute, or the state analog of the ABA 
Model Judicial Code—the challenged jurist is the initial, and in some cases 
sole or final, arbiter of whether he is sufficiently impartial to continue 
presiding over the case.170  Although the procedures governing who 
makes the initial disqualification decision differ from state to state, the 
procedural rules applicable to a party’s request that a jurist step aside 
falls into one of two basic categories:  pre-emptory disqualification or 
disqualification for cause.171  In a majority of states, a jurist cannot be 
disqualified without cause, either actual bias or an appearance of bias 
must be demonstrated.172  A significant minority of states (a total of 
eighteen states mostly in the mid-west and west) currently permit the 
use of peremptory challenges in some of their courts some of the time.173  
However, all eighteen of those states restrict the use of peremptory 
challenges in some way—requiring that the motion be “timely” filed, the 
movant allege sufficient grounds for removal, and other measures—that 
result in the application of a discretionary standard by the challenged 
jurist in many cases.174  Even in the handful of states where the pre-
emptory disqualification is essentially automatic, each side of the 
litigation (even when there are multiple parties on a side) is limited to 
one unconditional peremptory challenge in each case, and all subsequent 
                                                 
170 See Serbulea, supra note 92, at 1122–23, 1151–73 (detailing the procedures for each state 
that allow a judge to make a self-determination regarding bias). 
171 See FLAMM, supra note 76, at 25 (noting there are three procedures for removal of a 
jurist:  (1) voluntary disqualification or recusal; (2) peremptory disqualification; and (3) for 
cause disqualification); see also Serbulea, supra note 92, at 1122–23 n.105, (reflecting that 
seventeen states use some form of peremptory challenge procedure and the remaining 
thirty-three states require a decision on the merits of any disqualification motion). 
172 See FLAMM, supra note 76, at 29–30 (highlighting the practices of disqualification in 
various states). 
173 See id. (demonstrating that some states that permit some form of “without cause” 
peremptory disqualification including Alaska, Arizona, California, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, 
Minnesota, Missouri, Montana, Nevada, New Mexico, North Dakota, Oregon, South 
Dakota, Texas, Washington, Wisconsin, and Wyoming). 
174 See id. at 769–70, 772–74 (noting that peremptory challenge statutes or rules typically 
require the application to be “timely” made and limiting the right to use such procedures 
to one challenge per side per proceeding, as well as imposing other restrictions). 
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disqualification challenges must demonstrate sufficient cause.175  Thus, 
the majority of disqualification decisions in state courts will, at least 
initially, be considered by the challenged jurist who is permitted to 
exercise considerable discretion over the disqualification decision. 
IV.  THE CHANCY COMBINATION OF OBJECTIVE STANDARDS, SELF-
DISQUALIFYING PROCEDURES, AND THE BIAS BLIND SPOT 
While each of these aspects of disqualification disputes—the 
objective reasonable person standard, the “self-disqualifying” 
procedures used in most courts, and the Bias Blind Spot affecting the 
decision maker—present unique problems in themselves, the manner in 
which all three are combined in current disqualification practice 
introduces systemic error affecting a large number of proceedings and 
that, in turn, erodes public confidence in the courts.176  Although 
ubiquitous in American law, the often used reasonable person standard 
is increasingly under scrutiny as both judges and scholars question its 
objectivity and reliability.177  Also, the procedures followed in most 
federal and state courts that allow challenged jurists to decide 
disqualification motions directed at them (so called “self-
disqualification”), especially when coupled with a lack of other 
procedural protections, are highly controversial because the practice 
leaves litigants vulnerable to the challenged jurist’s subjective and biased 
interpretation or application of the disqualification standard.178  These 
problems with the current substantive standard and the procedural 
practices are exacerbated by the Bias Blind Spot, which often causes the 
jurist to be unaware of how his objectivity about his own impartiality is 
impaired and causes “others” evaluating the jurist’s recusal decision to 
doubt his impartiality.179  Thus, the current substantive standards and 
                                                 
175 See id. at 769 (indicating that a substantial minority of states use unconditional 
peremptory disqualification but limit its use to a single challenge per side in each 
proceeding). 
176 Portions of this section have been adapted from Melinda Marbes, Refocusing Recusals:  
How the Bias Blind Spot Affects Disqualification Disputes and Should Re-shape Recusal Reform, 
originally published in 32 ST. LOUIS. PUB. L. REV. 235 (2013), which outlines the argument 
that even with the methods employed by the courts to avoid judicial bias, there are still 
problems with the methodologies that can affect confidence in the court system. 
177 See generally MAYO MORAN, RETHINKING THE REASONABLE PERSON:  AN EGALITARIAN 
RECONSTRUCTION OF THE OBJECTIVE STANDARD 144–46 (2003) (discussing problems with the 
“reasonable person” standard in a gendered, multi-racial, and multi-cultural society). 
178 See Hayes, supra note 90, at 100–01 (proposing changes to substantive standards to 
avoid “self-judging” in disqualification disputes). 
179 See generally Emily Pronin, Perception and Misperception of Bias in Human Judgment, 11 
TRENDS IN COGNITIVE SCI. 37–41 (2006) (investigating the effects of individual perceptions 
on bias and prejudice). 
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procedural practices exacerbate the Bias Blind Spot, and all three 
combined introduce cognitive errors that lead to defective 
disqualification decisions affecting substantive outcomes in ways that 
are difficult, if not impossible, for the challenged jurist to gauge or 
correct. 
A. The Bias Blind Spot Distorts Disqualification Decisions 
The Bias Blind Spot has three important sources that create a 
distorted view of the self-disqualifying jurist’s own impartiality and 
cause the jurist’s perception of his own bias to conflict with others’ view 
of his impartiality.180  First, the Bias Blind Spot is motivated, at least in 
part, by well-documented self-enhancement and self-interest biases, 
which color our views of self.181  Second, the Bias Blind Spot is based 
upon Naïve Realism, which at its core is the conviction that we perceive 
objects and events in the world the way “they really are”—in other 
words, objectively—and when others do not perceive things as we do, 
then we infer there is something wrong with them.182  Third, the Bias 
Blind Spot causes one to assess his own biases based upon introspective 
evidence (which seldom reveals any traces of biases at work), but use 
extrospective evidence when judging others.183  Finally, these aspects of 
the Bias Blind Spot create an asymmetry in perception of biases between 
the “self” and “others,” which leads to attributions of improper motives 
in making assessments of partiality.184  Thus, the Bias Blind Spot, 
especially when combined with the substantive standards and 
procedures currently used in most disqualification disputes, causes 
jurists to make incorrect or, at least, seemingly incorrect, decisions about 
their own impartiality, which ultimately undermines the public 
confidence in the judiciary. 
                                                 
180 See id. at 37 (discussing the different sources of cognitive, perceptual, and motivational 
biases). 
181 Id. at 37–38. 
182 See Lee Ross & Andrew Ward, Naïve Realism in Everyday Life:  Implications for Social 
Conflict and Misunderstanding, STAN. CTR. ON CONFLICT & NEGOTIATION 103, 110–11 (1995) 
(explaining the layperson’s social understanding). 
183 Emily Pronin & Matthew V. Kugler, Valuing Thoughts, Ignoring Behavior:  The 
Introspection Illusion as a Source of the Bias Blind Spot, 43 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 565, 
570 (2007). 
184 See Pronin, supra note 179, at 37, 41 (discussing the differing perceptions of bias 
between the self and others); see also Joyce Ehrlinger et al, Peering Into the Bias Blind Spot:  
People’s Assessments of Bias in Themselves and Others, 31 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 
1, 2 (2005) (suggesting self-enhancement motivation and naïve realist cognitive illusions as 
among the reasons we rely upon introspection when evaluating our own bias). 
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1. Self-Enhancement and Self-Interest Blind Us to Our Own Biases 
The Bias Blind Spot is actuated, at least in part, by two well-
documented egocentric biases:  (1) self-enhancement and (2) self-
interest.185  The self-enhancement bias reflects the fact that people are 
inclined to see themselves in a positive light, even when they are 
presented with objective evidence of their own biases.186  The self-
interest bias results in people either denying the influence of self-interest 
on their own behavior or claiming such interests make them more 
objective.187  Although we generally acknowledge the existence of the 
ego-protecting biases, at least in the abstract, people are blind to the 
impact of self-enhancement and self-interest biases on them in specific 
instances.188  Moreover, while we are slow to acknowledge the possibility 
that we are biased by ego-protection concerns, we are quick to infer such 
factors influence others’ decisions and conduct.189  Thus, we are more 
likely to view others as improperly influenced by self-enhancement or 
self-interest concerns, but are blind to see how the same biases operate to 
affect our own decisions and behavior. 
a. Self-Enhancement Concerns Help Create the Bias Blind Spot 
We are all susceptible to the self-enhancement bias and often we do 
not even realize we are affected by this well-documented bias.190  At least 
in the abstract, most people acknowledge the role that the self-
enhancement bias plays in human cognition.191  However, we tend to 
overlook or downplay the impact it has on our own judgments.192  In 
fact, even when people “rate themselves as ‘better than average’ on a 
wide range of traits and abilities, most people also claim that their overly 
positive self-views are objectively true.”193  Moreover, they hold to their 
skewed view of themselves even after they are confronted by the 
evidence of the self-enhancement bias that afflicts us all.194  Thus, 
people’s judgments of themselves usually are more favorable than 
                                                 
185 Pronin, supra note 179, at 37. 
186 Id. 
187 Id. at 37–38. 
188 See id. (providing examples of studies). 
189 See id. (noting that human behavior is often guided by others’ judgments and actions). 
190 Id. at 37. 
191 Pronin, supra note 179, at 37. 
192 Id. 
193 Id. (endnote omitted). 
194 Id. 
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objective assessments and people seldom realize their self-assessments 
are biased.195 
b. Self-Interest Colors Our View of Our Own Biases 
In addition to self-enhancement bias, people unwittingly suffer from 
self-interest bias, which also colors their judgment.196  Generally, people 
believe self-interests motivate human judgments and actions.197  
However, people tend to overestimate the role that self-interest plays in 
others’ decisions and to underestimate the impact of self-interest in their 
own judgments.198  When people acknowledge that their self-interest 
may affect their judgments and actions, they usually believe those self-
interests are particularly enlightening rather than a source of bias.199  
Thus, people are more likely to believe that others are motivated by self-
interest and that they themselves are free from distorting self-interested 
biases.200 
2. Naïve Realism Distorts Our View of Our Own Biases and Our View 
of Others’ Biases 
A second major cause of the Bias Blind Spot is Naïve Realism.201  
Naïve Realism is the conviction that we perceive objects and events in 
the world the way they really are—in other words, objectively—and 
when others do not perceive things as we do, we infer there is something 
wrong with them.202  As described by the renowned social psychologist 
                                                 
195 Id. 
196 Id. 
197 Pronin, supra note 179, at 37. 
198 See id. at 37–38 (indicating that people believe hard work is motivated by external 
incentives whereas personal motivation stems from internal incentives). 
199 See EMILY PRONIN ET AL., UNDERSTANDING MISUNDERSTANDING:  SOCIAL 
PSYCHOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES 636, 647 (2002) [hereinafter UNDERSTANDING 
MISUNDERSTANDING] (recognizing that there are cases where our views and priorities 
reflect our unique status or experiences).  In such cases: 
[W]e are inclined to feel that our particular vantage point (e.g., that of 
a devout Christian, the child of an alcoholic, a volunteer at the local 
battered women’s shelter, or the CEO of a Fortune 500 company) has 
been particularly enlightening.  By contrast, we see others’ unique 
status or unique experiences as a source of inevitable and 
understandable biases that distort their objectivity and lead them to 
unwise or unreasonable positions on the relevant issues. 
Id. 
200 Pronin, supra note 179, at 37. 
201 See Ross & Ward, supra note 182, at 110 (explaining Naïve Realism). 
202 See id. at 110–11 (providing examples of a layperson’s convictions about subjective 
experiences). 
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Lee Ross and his collaborator, Andrew Ward, Naïve Realism is 
deceptively simple and is made up of only three essential tenets: 
1. I “see” the world objectively—“as it really is.” 
2. Other reasonable people should “see” the world the way I 
do. 
3. If other people don’t “see” the world as I do, then they 
aren’t seeing clearly.203 
Although we acknowledge, at least in the abstract, the subjectivity of 
our perceptions when we look at the world, we assume what we 
perceive is an unmediated reality—the objects and events “as they really 
are” with no cognitive filters.204  Given this belief in our own objectivity 
and a conviction that we are reasonable people, we do not attribute the 
difference with the other to something faulty with our perception or 
assume that the disagreement simply reflects different choices made by 
two reasonable and honest people.205  Instead, when others who have all 
the pertinent information do not agree with our view, we attribute 
undesirable traits (such as a lack of intelligence) or improper motives (a 
lack of impartiality) to make sense of the disagreement.206  Thus, we infer 
those others have shortcomings that explain their disagreement with us 
rather than concede that there may be something wrong with us or that 
our view of “reality” may not be correct.207 
                                                 
203 Id.  This syllogism was articulated by Lee Ross and Andrew Ward in their seminal 
work on Naïve Realism as follows: 
1. That I [perceive] entities and events as they are in objective reality and 
that my social attitudes, beliefs, preferences, priorities, and the like 
follow from a relatively dispassionate, unbiased, and essentially 
“unmediated” apprehension of the information or evidence at hand. 
2. That other rational social perceivers generally will share my [worldview, 
including my] reactions, behaviors, and opinions—provided that they have 
had access to the same information that gave rise to my views, and 
provided that they too have processed that information in a reasonably 
thoughtful and open-minded fashion. 
3. That the failure of [other] individual[s] or group[s] to share my 
[worldview] arises from one of three possible sources—[they (a) are not 
informed; (b) are irrational; or (c) are not impartial—being biased] by 
ideology, self-interest, or some other distorting personal influence. 
Id. (emphasis added). 
204 Emily Pronin et al, Objectivity in the Eye of the Beholder:  Divergent Perceptions of Bias in 
Self Versus Others, 111 PSYCHOL. REV. 781, 783 (2004) [hereinafter Objectivity in the Eye of the 
Beholder]. 
205 Id. 
206 Id. 
207 Id. 
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a. The Illusion of Objectivity 
We cannot attribute the others’ disagreement to our faulty 
perception because as naïve realists, we suffer from the illusion that our 
version of the thing or event in question reflects an objective reality.208  
We believe we are objective in spite of the fact that most of us concede, at 
least in the abstract, that “reality” is a mixture of sensory stimuli and our 
perception of those stimuli.209  This “subjective construal” of reality relies 
upon our “own needs, own emotions, own personality, [and] own 
previously formed cognitive patterns[]” to create a complete picture.210  
In other words, we do not perceive an objective reality, but merely a 
mediated version of objective facts that are interpreted through a variety 
of cognitive filters.211  Nevertheless, we believe we perceive an objective 
“reality” that reasonable others should perceive as well.212 
Not only do we construct our version of “reality,” but we are 
seemingly unaware that we suffer from this “illusion of objectivity.”213  
We are convinced that we are objective about our perceptions of the 
objects in the world—the smells, sights, and sounds.214  This illusion of 
our objectivity also extends to interpersonal relations and other more 
complex social events.215  These subjective interpretations of the 
phenomena we encounter affect the way we perceive ourselves, others, 
and our situations and, in turn, impact how we interact with others in a 
                                                 
208 Id. 
209 See Dale W. Griffin & Lee Ross, Subjective Construal, Social Inference, and Human 
Misunderstanding, in 24 ADVANCES IN EXPERIMENTAL SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 319, 320–21 
(Mark P. Zanna ed., 1991) (quoting Jerome Bruner’s famous 1957 statement “that the 
perceiver must, in seeking to understand an event, ‘go beyond the information given’”). 
210 See id. at 321 (quoting DAVID KRECH & RICHARD S. CRUTCHFIELD, THEORY AND 
PROBLEMS OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 94 (1948)). 
211 See id. (citing to Krech and Crutchfield’s argument that “there are no impartial 
‘facts’”). 
212 Pronin, supra note 179, at 37. 
213 Id. 
214 See, e.g., Ross & Ward, supra note 182, at 114 (citing a study designed to test subjective 
construal of stimuli—the “Musical Tapping” test).  The study volunteers were assigned the 
task of either listening to or tapping out songs from twenty-five well-known musical pieces 
and the listeners were required to identify the song.  Id.  The difference in the experience of 
musical tappers and listeners seems obvious—seeing it from the vantage point of the 
study’s architects—but the differences in perception were not so obvious to the study 
participants.  Id. 
215 See id. at 106–07 (1996) (describing a study that was a variation on the classic 
Prisoner’s Dilemma Game in which the object of the game was to win money).  The name 
of the game was changed to suggest whether the game should be played competitively or 
cooperatively.  Id. at 106.   The results of the experiment reflected that how the game was 
labeled and, presumably, the different subjective construals evoked by such labels, had the 
most significant impact on how the volunteers behaved—competitively or cooperatively.  
Id. 
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variety of complex social settings.216  More importantly, the brain plays 
this trick—subjectively construing the stimuli we encounter to create 
perceptions of “reality”—without us ever knowing we are doing it.217  
Thus, our minds make us believe that we “see” the world objectively, 
though what we actually “see” is our subjective construal of what we 
perceive.218 
b. The Confirmation Bias and Unwarranted Perseverance of Beliefs 
The subjective interpretations we construct are likely to persevere, 
even in the face of contradictory evidence, because of the “confirmation 
bias.”219  When we assimilate new evidence, we “go beyond the 
information [actually] given”—by “fill[ing] in [the] details . . . to give 
events coherence and meaning.”220  Of course, we have little reason to 
think critically of how we select and process new information because 
we start from the naïve premise that we are objective.221  Our illusion of 
objectivity, coupled with the way we “fill in the gaps” leads us to accept 
with little scrutiny the evidence that is consistent with our existing 
perspectives and beliefs.222  On the other hand, we intently scrutinize any 
evidence that is inconsistent with our understanding to resolve the 
cognitive dissonance such new information creates.223  This process of 
“biased assimilation of new information”—the confirmation bias—often 
“leads to unwarranted perseverance of beliefs” including an 
unwarranted belief in our objectivity.224  Thus, not only does our mind 
fool us into thinking we are objective, it fools us into confirming that 
belief by selectively relying solely on information that confirms our 
belief about our own objectivity.225 
                                                 
216  See Ross & Ward, supra note 182, at 104 (asserting that differences in subjective or 
construal “matter” have an impact on everyday life and that social perceivers usually make 
“insufficient allowances” for the impact of subjective construal when making inferences or 
predictions about others). 
217 See supra Part IV.A.2 (discussing people’s unconscious perception of reality). 
218 See Ross & Ward, supra note 182, at 110 (comparing the relation between subjective 
experience and the event that gave rise to the subjective experience). 
219 See Objectivity in the Eye of the Beholder, supra note 204, at 788–89 (analyzing perceived 
attitudes and behavior discrepancy in attributions of bias). 
220 Ross & Ward, supra note 182, at 118. 
221 See Objectivity in the Eye of the Beholder, supra note 204, at 796 (describing several 
studies that demonstrate this biased assimilation and the resulting perseverance of 
unwarranted beliefs). 
222 Id. 
223 Id. 
224 Id. (citation omitted). 
225 Id. 
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3. The Introspection Illusion Confirms Our False Belief That We are 
Unbiased 
We are able to maintain this false belief in our own objectivity, even 
after making an effort to determine whether our beliefs are biased 
because of the way we evaluate our own biases.226  This is true because in 
assessing our own biases, we rely heavily on introspection.227  In essence, 
we search our private thoughts, feelings, motives, and beliefs, rather 
than evaluate our own behavior, to detect our own biases.228  This 
method of assessing our own biases may confirm our capacity for bias—
at least in the abstract or in past circumstances—but introspection often 
results in our detecting no bias in the present instance.229  This 
introspective method of assessing bias—using internal evidence—is not 
particularly reliable because we have no direct conscious access to “the 
cognitive and motivational processes (to say nothing of the underlying 
biochemical processes) that influence our perceptions [of reality].”230  
Thus, it is not surprising that our introspective analysis seldom reveals 
any conscious bias in our behavior or our beliefs. 
4. The Bias Blind Spot Creates Differing Perceptions of Bias in Self and 
Bias in Others 
While we use introspection to assess our own biases, we evaluate 
extrospective evidence when assessing the impartiality of others and this 
difference in perspective results in an asymmetry in perceptions of bias 
between self and other.231  When we discern bias in others, we mostly 
rely upon external evidence—the others’ conduct and our theories of 
what constitutes biased behavior.232  Even when we do have access to 
others’ thoughts, feelings, beliefs, and conscious motives about their own 
biases, we tend to give that introspective evidence little, if any, weight.233  
We give others’ introspective accounts of their decisions and conduct 
                                                 
226 See Pronin & Kugler, supra note 183, at 566 (defining “introspection illusion”). 
227 Id. 
228 Id. 
229 Id. 
230 Emily Pronin et al., The Bias Blind Spot:  Perceptions of Bias in Self Versus Others, 28 
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 369, 378 (2002) (citations omitted) [hereinafter The Bias 
Blind Spot]. 
231 See Pronin, supra note 179, at 38 (evaluating the difference in perceptions of bias). 
232 See Pronin & Kugler, supra note 183, at 566 (discussing the reliance on feelings when 
evaluating one’s own biases). 
233 See id. at 575 (examining how participants in the study reported attending more to 
introspective information than behavioral information for assessing bias in themselves but 
not for others). 
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less weight because we believe that such accounts are not objective, 
reflect bias, or otherwise are not valuable.234  Thus, we assess our own 
biases using introspective evidence and use extrospective data to 
evaluate the biases of others and, thereby, create different standards for 
self-perception and social perception of bias. 
B. Bias Blind Spot Leads to Defective Disqualification Decisions and Corrodes 
Confidence in the Judiciary 
These biased perceptions of self and misperceptions of bias in others 
have important implications for specific judicial disqualification 
decisions and public confidence in the judiciary as a whole.  First, the 
Bias Blind Spot creates biased perceptions of the jurist’s own biases, 
which when combined with the current procedural practice of “self-
disqualification” can lead to defective disqualification decisions in 
specific cases.235  Second, the Bias Blind Spot causes us to misperceive 
bias in others, which misperception—when combined with the current 
substantive standards and the practice of self-disqualification—can 
corrode public confidence in the judiciary as a whole.236  Given these 
problems, we need to reform either the disqualification standards or the 
procedural practices currently used by most courts in deciding 
disqualification disputes.  However, given the current disagreements 
about the proper substantive standards for bias-based disqualification, 
the most efficient and effective reforms are likely to be changes in the 
procedures used in disqualification disputes. 
1. The Bias Blind Spot Leads to Defective Disqualification Decisions 
The current procedural practices followed in most state and federal 
courts make it nearly impossible for a challenged jurist to avoid making 
a defective disqualification decision because the Bias Blind Spot creates 
biased perceptions of the jurist’s impartiality without him even knowing 
it.237  The common practice in state and federal courts of “self-
disqualification” permits the challenged jurist to determine, at least in 
                                                 
234 See id. at 570, 575–76 (expounding on how participants perceived more bias in others 
than they did in themselves). 
235 See infra Part III.C (examining how in both state and federal court a challenged jurist 
can practice “self-disqualification”). 
236 See supra Part IV.B (elaborating on how the Bias Blind Spot causes misperception of 
bias in others, and therefore can corrode public confidence in the judiciary system). 
237 See supra Part IV.B.1 (analyzing how the Bias Blind Spot leads to defective 
disqualification decisions). 
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the first instance, if he is actually, probably, or apparently impartial.238  
However, the challenged jurist, like the rest of us, suffers from the Bias 
Blind Spot—which impairs the challenged jurist’s ability to be an 
impartial arbiter of his own impartiality.239  Moreover, the jurist is 
unlikely to be aware of the impact of his biases on the disqualification 
decision—even after searching his feelings, opinions, and thoughts for 
evidence of bias—because the Bias Blind Spot operates on a 
nonconscious level, which makes it difficult, if not impossible, to 
detect.240  Thus, the current practice of allowing “self-disqualification” 
increases the chance a defective disqualification decision will be made 
because the challenged jurist suffers from the Bias Blind Spot. 
2. The Bias Blind Spot Causes Reasonable Others to Doubt the Self-
Disqualifying Jurist’s Decision 
In addition to creating incorrect disqualification decisions, the 
challenged jurist’s use of “self-disqualification” procedures coupled with 
a self-centered standard to judge his own biases likely will lead to a loss 
of public confidence in the courts.  This is another predictable 
consequence of the Bias Blind Spot that happens because the challenged 
jurist’s subjective perception of his own actual, probable, or apparent 
partiality is different from the objective standard that “others”—whether 
the litigants, other judges, the public, or the press—are likely to use to 
evaluate the jurist’s partiality.241  The targeted jurist will use 
introspective evidence—primarily his thoughts, feelings, beliefs, and 
conscious motives—to determine if he believes he is actually, probably, 
or apparently biased.242  Those “others” will assess the jurist’s bias upon 
                                                 
238 See supra Part III.C (discussing current procedures used in federal and state 
disqualification disputes). 
239 See Chris Guthrie et al., Inside the Judicial Mind, 86 CORNELL L. REV. 777, 820–21 (2001) 
(demonstrating that judges are just as likely to be affected by a number of cognitive 
illusions as the ordinary public).  Although the myriad of studies demonstrating various 
aspects of the Bias Blind Spot did not uses judges, justices, or other judicial officers as 
participants, there is no reason to believe jurists are immune from this cognitive illusion.  
Id.  In fact, when jurists have been tested for other common cognitive illusions the results 
are similar to results in other studies.  Id.; see also supra notes 117–53 and accompanying text 
(discussing the causes and consequences of the Bias Blind Spot). 
240 See supra note 234 and accompanying text (explaining the introspection illusion and 
unconscious impact of the Bias Blind Spot). 
241 See supra Part III.C.4 (addressing the use of different evidence to evaluate bias in self 
and others and the related differences in self and social perspectives). 
242 See supra Part IV.A (establishing the ways in which the Objectivity Illusion, the 
Confirmation Bias, and the Introspection Illusion help create our Bias Blind Spot). 
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his words and deeds.243  This asymmetry in perception between the self-
disqualifying jurist and those reasonable “others” evaluating his actual, 
probable, or apparent bias is likely to cause differences in opinion 
regarding the dependability of specific disqualification decisions.244 
In addition, the Bias Blind Spot causes “others” to misperceive or at 
least perceive differently the challenged jurist’s actual, probable, or 
apparent bias.245  This leads “others” to unwittingly be overconfident in 
their own assessment of the challenged jurist’s bias and to readily believe 
the jurist’s self-assessments are motivated by a lack of proper 
information, intelligence, or integrity.246  As a result, the current 
substantive standards and “self-disqualifying” procedural practices, 
when combined with the cognitive illusions created by the Bias Blind 
Spot are likely to undermine the public confidence in the challenged 
jurist, the resulting disqualification decision, and the courts generally.  
Thus, we should reform recusal practice by reshaping recusal procedures 
in specific ways to avoid the distortions caused by the Bias Blind Spot. 
V.  RESHAPING RECUSAL PROCEDURES TO AVOID THE BIAS BLIND SPOT 
In order to counter how the Bias Blind Spot distorts disqualification 
decisions, we must either reform the substantive standards or we must 
reshape recusal procedures, and doing the latter holds the most promise 
for actually achieving recusal reform.  The substantive standards for 
disqualification could be changed—but currently there is no consensus 
on what substantive changes to make and there likely will not be 
agreement any time soon.247  This is true, at least in part, because of 
disagreements about two fundamental issues:  (1) whether jurists should 
enjoy a strong presumption of impartiality; and (2) what, if any, interests 
(personal, relational, or political) are required to overcome that 
presumption.248  So, currently the only realistic option is to reshape the 
                                                 
243 See supra Part III.C.4 (reiterating the use of introspective evidence to evaluate bias in 
self and the use of extrospective evidence to assess bias in others). 
244 See supra Part IV.A (providing asymmetries in perceptions of bias). 
245 See supra Part IV (analyzing the Bias Blind Spot). 
246 See supra Part IV.A.2 (presenting the viewpoint that naïve realism makes us confident 
in our objectivity and causes us to make attributions about others who do not share our 
view of “reality”). 
247 See Charles Gardner Geyh, Why Judicial Disqualification Matters.  Again., 30 REV. LITIG. 
671, 677 (2011) [hereinafter Why Judicial Disqualification Matters] (explaining that there is no 
agreement between the legal establishment and the public—or even within each sphere—
regarding what constitutes an appearance of partiality). 
248 See id. (discussing the appearances regime).  Dean Geyh argues: 
Currently, the legal establishment is deeply divided over when it is 
reasonable for the presumption of impartiality to yield to the suspicion 
that extralegal influences may have compromised the judge's impartial 
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procedural practices used to decide disqualification disputes.  Thus, the 
reforms proposed in this Article are focused on procedural changes that 
are designed to address the distorting influence of the Bias Blind Spot in 
disqualification decisions.  
A. Self-Disqualification Must Be Eliminated and Other Procedural Reforms 
Must Be Made 
Given the mechanisms that contribute to creation of the Bias Blind 
Spot, at least three procedural reforms are required.249  First, Part V.A.1 
discusses how the challenged jurist must be removed as the sole or final 
judge of his own partiality either by adopting peremptory challenges or 
requiring a judge, panel of judges, or other neutral decision maker rule 
on disqualification motions.250  If the challenged jurist is not eliminated 
in one of these ways, then the targeted jurist’s denial of disqualification 
must be subject to immediate or interlocutory review using the less 
deferential de novo review.251  Next, Part V.A.2 shows how, in order to 
make these two reforms worthwhile, all jurists and the parties must 
provide meaningful, timely disclosure of possible grounds for conflict or 
bias.252  Finally, Part V.A.3 explains the decision to deny any recusal 
request must be in writing and provide a thorough application of the 
facts to the substantive standard for disqualification.253  If these three 
reforms are endorsed and executed, then the Bias Blind Spot can be 
corrected and the litigants, press, and public will have a clear vision of 
an impartial judiciary. 
1. The Challenged Jurist Must Not Be the Sole or Final Arbiter of His 
Own Partiality 
The first and most important reform is the removal of the challenged 
jurist as the sole or final judge of his own partiality because the best way 
                                                                                                             
judgment.  The general public is comparably divided, and between the 
legal establishment and the general public, there are still further 
divisions.  The net effect is that except in extreme or well-settled cases, 
consensus on when it is fair or reasonable to doubt the impartiality of a 
judge is elusive—we do not know it when we see it. 
Id. 
249 See infra Part V.A (evaluating the three reforms this Article proposes). 
250 See infra Part V.A.1 (proposing that a challenged jurist should not be the final arbiter 
of his own impartiality). 
251 See infra Part V.A.1 (providing alternative repercussions if the challenged jurist is not 
removed).  
252 See infra Part V.A.2 (analyzing the timely disclosures of challenged jurists). 
253 See infra Part V.A.3 (examining the reasons for denying disqualification). 
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for “avoiding bias is to avoid the situations that produce it.”254  First, the 
courts or legislatures could adopt the use of a limited number of 
peremptory challenges—either with or without factual substantiation.255  
Second, the challenged jurist could be removed from the disqualification 
decision entirely by referring the decision to another jurist or panel of 
neutral decision makers.256  Third, if the circumstances at the court do 
not permit either of these reforms, then the challenged jurist may be 
permitted to make an initial decision regarding disqualification but 
would be removed as the sole or final arbiter by providing for prompt de 
novo review by another judge or an en banc panel of the court if the initial 
decision by the targeted jurist is to deny disqualification.257  Each of these 
modified procedures has clear benefits and some costs as well, which 
must be evaluated to determine which solution is best to implement 
given the circumstances of each federal or state court. 
                                                 
254 Daniel Gilbert, I’m O.K., You’re Biased, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 16, 2006), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/04/16/opinion/16gilbert.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0, 
archived at http://perma.cc/8XV5-DK2.  Daniel Gilbert is a Professor of Psychology at 
Harvard University who researches and writes about cognitive psychology and is the 
author of the New York Times Bestseller “Stumbling on Happiness.”  Id. 
255 See Louis J. Virelli, The (Un)Constitutionality of Supreme Court Recusal Standards, 2011 
WIS. L. REV 1181, 1218 (2011) (arguing that Congressional attempts to define the recusal 
standards for SCOTUS violates the constitutional Separation of Powers and offends 
federalism principles).  It is entirely possible that if the courts do not themselves adopt 
some type of procedural solutions that state legislatures or Congress will mandate changes.  
See, e.g., Supreme Court Transparency and Disclosure Act of 2011, H.R. 862, 112th Cong. 
(2011) (proposing that the U.S. Code of Judicial Conduct be applied to SCOTUS and 
expounding on the need to establish certain procedures with respect to the recusal of the 
Justices); IA CODE OF JUD. CONDUCT Canon 2(4)(a)–(b) (2014) (expounding on how judges 
must disqualify themselves when certain campaign contributions are made); OK CODE OF 
JUD. CONDUCT Canon 1 cmt. 5 (2014) (elaborating on the test for the appearance of 
impropriety by a judge); UT CODE OF JUD. CONDUCT Canon 2 (2014) (discussing rules that 
govern the judge’s appoint of lawyers to administrative positions, especially relating to 
campaigns).  However, whether any attempts to legislate in the area of judicial ethics and 
recusals would be valid exercises of legislative authority or otherwise effective remains to 
be seen. 
256 See Virelli, supra note 255, at 1221 (discussing ways in which a challenged jurist can be 
removed); see also Steven Lubet & Clare Diegel, Stonewalling, Leaks, and Counter-Leaks:  
SCOTUS Ethics in the Wake of NFIB v. Sebelius, 47 VAL. U. L. REV. 883, 905 (concluding that 
“[n]o individual can have a clear perspective on his or her own impartiality, and decisions 
would therefore be better made by objective colleagues”); Sullivan, supra note 122, at 916 
(“Just as there is no recognized exception to the hearsay rule for ‘really important hearsay,’ 
there can be no exception to the requirement of judicial impartiality based on the fact that a 
particular Justice believes that he or she has a unique perspective and contribution to make 
to the decision of a case, even if his or her colleagues agree that the Justice’s participation is 
desirable or ‘really needed.’”). 
257 See id. (assessing the approaches that could occur if a challenged jurist denies 
disqualification). 
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This idea of requiring that the challenged jurist step aside certainly is 
not new and may even seem obvious—at least those who do not sit on 
the bench and make disqualification decisions.258  In fact, in recent years, 
a growing number of academics have called for this precise type of 
procedural reform.259  Also, some commentators who have questioned 
the practice of “self-disqualification” have even derisively referred to the 
custom.260  These criticisms have not been limited to a handful of legal 
academics—but, instead, are part of an increasingly bitter public 
dialogue surrounding disqualification decisions in high profile cases and 
the debate about recusal reform.261  In fact, “one of the most criticized 
                                                 
258 See Note, Disqualification of a Judge on Grounds of Bias, 41 HARV. L. REV. 78, 81 (1927) (“A 
biased mind rarely realizes its own imperfection and would normally prevent that perfect 
equipoise so desirable in our system of trial.”); Jeffrey W. Stempel, In Praise of Procedurally 
Centered Judicial Disqualification—and a Stronger Conception of the Appearance Standard:  Better 
Acknowledging and Adjusting to Cognitive Bias, Spoliation, and Perceptual Realities, 30 REV. 
LITIG. 733, 794 (2011) (arguing why recusal motions should be heard by independent 
judges).  Professor Stempel writes:   
The solution is obvious:  recusal motions should be heard and decided, 
even in first instance, by another trial judge in the relevant district.  
Where a challenge targets an appellate judge, it should be heard and 
decided by other members of the panel or, if necessary, by the court as 
a whole.  Where the challenge targets a United States Supreme Court 
Justice or a judge or justice of any other jurisdiction's highest court, the 
disqualification decision should be made by the entire court. 
Id.  Of course, the suggestion that this proposed solution is obvious may—itself—be a naïve 
realist expression of the “objective” reality perceived by those who believe this procedural 
reform is the reasonable answer. 
259 See, e.g., Amanda Frost, Keeping Up Appearances:  A Process-Oriented Approach to Judicial 
Recusal, 53 U. KAN. L. REV. 531, 584 (2005) (arguing that having neutral judges make the 
disqualification decision will create greater confidence in the judicial process); Why Judicial 
Disqualification Matters, supra note 247, at 693–94 (suggesting that given the lack of 
consensus on substantive disqualification standards, procedural reforms are needed); 
Stempel, supra note 258, at 804–05 (arguing that disqualification decisions made by the 
challenged jurist are suspect given a host of biasing influences and a professional culture 
that creates reluctant recusants); ADAM SKAGGS & ANDREW SILVER, BRENNAN CTR. FOR 
JUSTICE, PROMOTING FAIR AND IMPARTIAL COURTS THROUGH RECUSAL REFORM 9, 10 (Aug. 
2011), available at http://brennan.3cdn.net/09c926c04c9eed5290_e4m6iv2v0.pdf, archived at 
http://perma.cc/HJ8C-VRM8 (discussing eleven separate recusal reforms, including use of 
peremptory challenges to jurists). 
260 See, e.g., Bassett & Perschbacher, supra note 92, at 197 (referring to Justice Benjamin’s 
opinion rejecting any consideration of “appearances” of impropriety); Ross E. Davies, The 
Reluctant Recusants:  Two Parables of Supreme Judicial Disqualification, 10 GREEN BAG 2D 79, 79 
(2006) (labeling the practice of permitting a jurist to judge his own biases as ironic); John 
Leubsdorf, Theories of Judging and Judge Disqualification, 62 N.Y.U. L. REV. 237, 244 (1987) 
(suggesting that allowing the challenged jurist to decide the disqualification dispute is 
inappropriate). 
261 See Marbes, supra note 164, at 264 (examining how the Bias Blind Spot creates a bias 
conflict spiral that has affected specific cases and is impacting the debate about recusal 
reform within the academe and the larger legal community); see also Laurel A. Rigertas, The 
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features of recusal practice is the fact that in many states [and at the 
Supreme Court of the United States], the judge subject to a recusal 
request has the unreviewable last word on whether to step aside from a 
case.”262  These criticisms often are based on nothing more than common 
sense.263 However, social science studies regarding institutional 
legitimacy of the courts have indicated that procedural fairness is an 
important factor in public confidence and adherence to court decisions, 
even unpopular outcomes.264  Thus, it seems likely that implementing 
this single procedural safeguard—eliminating “self-disqualification”—
would go a long way toward addressing much of the criticism of current 
disqualification practices in specific cases and restoring public 
confidence in the judiciary as a whole. 
a. “Self-Disqualification” Must Be Eliminated 
The challenged jurist must be removed as the sole or final judge of 
his own partiality—this is the only sure way to avoid the impact of the 
Bias Blind Spot on disqualification decisions.  The targeted jurist must be 
taken out of the decision making process because the jurist cannot be 
unbiased about his own actual, probable, or apparent biases.265  This goal 
can best be accomplished by either:  (1) giving litigants the right to use 
peremptory challenges to disqualify actually, probably, or apparently 
                                                                                                             
Supreme Court and Recusals:  A Response to Professor Lubet, 47 VAL. U. L. REV. 939, 945 
(suggesting that a proposal requiring the remaining eight Supreme Court Justices to review 
the recusal of a fellow Justice “raise[s] some concerns about whether the public would 
construe such a review process as a way for a group of Justices to exclude a Justice for the 
purpose of pursuing a perceived partisan agenda”). 
262 See SKAGGS & SILVER, supra note 259, at 3 (“It flies in the face of fundamental notions of 
disinterested, impartial decision-making to allow a judge accused of bias to be the only one 
who decides whether he or she should be disqualified.”). 
263 See Disqualification of a Judge on the Ground of Bias, supra note 258, at 81 (“A biased mind 
rarely realizes its own imperfection that would normally prevent the perfect equipoise that 
is so desirable in our system of trial.”). 
264 See Tom R. Tyler & Kenneth Rasinski, Procedural Justice, Institutional Legitimacy, and the 
Acceptance of Unpopular U.S. Supreme Court Decisions:  A Reply to Gibson, 25 LAW & SOC’Y 
REV. 621, 626–27 (1991) (finding that “the legitimacy of the U.S. Supreme Court is based [at 
least indirectly] on the [public’s] belief that [the court] makes decisions in fair ways, not on 
agreement with its decisions”).  But see James L. Gibson, Institutional Legitimacy, Procedural 
Justice, and Compliance with Supreme Court Decisions:  A Question of Causality, 25 LAW & SOC’Y 
REV. 631, 631 (1991) (finding a lack of evidence of direct causal link between perceptions of 
procedural fairness and the public’s willingness to comply with unpopular SCOTUS 
decisions). 
265 See supra Part IV (discussing the chancy combination of objective standards, self-
disqualifying procedures, and the Bias Blind Spot). 
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partial jurists; or (2) requiring a judge, panel of judges, or other neutral 
decision maker to rule on disqualification motions.266 
While these proposed reforms will require adjustments to how 
disqualification decisions are administered, those changes are both 
possible and positive.  In fact, several state courts already use either 
peremptory challenges or neutral decision makers for disqualification 
disputes and those systems are mostly successful.267  Thus, the federal 
and remaining state courts should end the practice of “self-
disqualification” and adopt one of these alternative procedures in order 
to avoid defective or seemingly defective disqualification decisions 
caused by the Bias Blind Spot. 
b. Denial of Self-Disqualification Decisions Must Be Reviewed Promptly and 
De Novo 
If the removal of the challenged jurist as arbiter of his own 
disqualification is not practicable, then his decision must be subject to a 
right of immediate appeal using the less deferential de novo standard of 
review.  It is possible that some courts—especially those with only one 
jurist who regularly sits—or a court that is geographically remote cannot 
practically implement the preferred reforms—using peremptory 
challenges or eliminating self-disqualification. In those jurisdictions 
where the challenged jurist is the only person who can make the initial 
decision, an immediate right of appeal using the less deferential de novo 
standard of review must be provided to preserve litigants’ rights to a fair 
trial and preserve public confidence in the judiciary. 
Currently, there are few, if any, realistic avenues for review of a 
decision denying disqualification—even one decided by the challenged 
jurist himself.  Although the disappointed party can seek reconsideration 
of the order denying disqualification, courts are very reluctant to grant 
relief where self-disqualification procedures are used.268  The remaining 
methods of review are:  (1) right of appeal from final order; (2) 
                                                 
266 See supra Part V.A (reshaping recusal procedures to avoid the Bias Blind Spot). 
267 See FLAMM, supra note 76, at 505–07 (indicating that while most states require the 
challenged jurist to decide, at least initially, a number of states either use peremptory 
challenges or permit or require that another judge or panel of jurists decide disqualification 
disputes).  But cf. Order Repealing Rule 21.1(a) of the Wyoming Rules of Criminal 
Procedure & Order Amending Rule 40.1 of the Wyoming Rules of Civil Procedure, In the 
Matter of the Repeal of Rule 21.1(a) of the Wyoming Rules of Criminal Procedure & 
Amendment of Rule 40.1 of the Wyoming Rules of Civil Procedure (Nov. 26, 2013) 
(repealing the rule permitting peremptory challenges in criminal and juvenile cases due to 
blanket uses and other abuses but continuing to permit such challenges in civil cases). 
268 See FLAMM, supra note 76, at 960 (noting that courts are “typically quite reluctant to 
grant a motion seeking reconsideration of a disqualification order[]” (footnote omitted)). 
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interlocutory appeal of order that is certified as final and reviewable; (3) 
immediate review under the collateral order doctrine; or (4) an 
extraordinary writ.269  However, there are serious roadblocks along the 
way for each of these potential routes for review.  First, a disqualification 
decision is unlikely to resolve the underlying case and, therefore, the 
final order rule will block review through the right of direct appeal.270  
Second, a “self-disqualification” order is unlikely to be reviewed using 
an interlocutory appeal because those procedures typically require the 
jurist whose order is being appealed to certify that the order is a “final 
judgment” and that “there is no just reason for delay”—something that is 
unlikely to happen.271  Third, immediate review under the collateral 
order doctrine will most likely not be available because it requires that 
the challenged jurist agree the decision he just made about his lack of 
bias is a reasonably close question about “which there is substantial 
ground for a difference of opinion.”272  Fourth, the writs of mandamus or 
prohibition are extraordinary remedies that will be successful only if the 
party seeking relief can meet the high standard of demonstrating the 
disqualification decision was a clear abuse of discretion—in other words, 
so far out of bounds as to be unreasonable.273  Thus, without an express 
right of immediate appeal, most orders denying disqualification are not 
subject to meaningful review, even though the challenged jurist was the 
arbiter of his own partiality. 
In addition, the current standard of review used by most federal and 
state trial courts to decide disqualification disputes is too deferential 
given the importance of the right to fair trial that is at stake.  Most 
federal and state court disqualification decisions are reviewed using an 
“abuse of discretion”—rather than the de novo—standard.274  It is true 
that the standards of review are somewhat difficult to rank because the 
                                                 
269 See id. at 959–68 (exploring these various routes for appellate review and concluding 
that few requests for review are likely to be successful). 
270 See id. at 959–63 (outlining the different routes for appellate review of disqualification 
decisions and finding relief on appeal unlikely); see also Stempel, supra note 258, at 797–98 
(finding a right of direct appeal from disqualification decisions generally does not exist). 
271 See FLAMM, supra note 76, at 959–61 (discussing appellate review of disqualification 
decisions); see also Stempel, supra note 258, at 797 & n.195 (finding it unlikely courts will 
certify interlocutory appeals from disqualification decisions given the standards). 
272 Stempel, supra note 258, at 798; see FLAMM, supra note 76, at 963–64 (noting that a party 
who is aggrieved by a disqualification decision can attempt to invoke the collateral order 
exception). 
273 See FLAMM, supra note 76, at 967–68 (pointing out that appellate courts have been 
reluctant to issue writs of mandamus); see also Stempel, supra note 258, at 797–98 (finding it 
unlikely the challenged jurist will certify interlocutory appeals from disqualification 
decisions because he would have to concede he may be or appear to be biased). 
274 See FLAMM, supra note 76, at 984–86 (stating that “abuse of discretion” is the 
predominant standard of appellate review of disqualification decisions). 
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abuse of discretion standard focuses on the decision maker, and de novo 
review is undertaken from the perspective of the appellate court.275  
However, the abuse of discretion standard is too deferential when 
applied to “self-disqualification” decisions because the review standard 
is based upon two incorrect premises. First, the abuse of discretion 
standard improperly presumes that disqualification is a matter of 
judicial discretion rather than a mandatory rule that protects the 
litigant’s fundamental right to a fair trial.276  Second, use of the abuse of 
discretion standard does not properly account for the Bias Blind Spot 
because the standard improperly presumes the correctness of the initial 
self-disqualification decision.277  Thus, a more rigorous appellate review 
using a de novo standard is needed to protect the litigant’s right to a fair 
trial and ameliorate the effect of the Bias Blind Spot in disqualification 
disputes. 
2. Meaningful and Timely Disclosure of Interests and Relationships 
Must Be Made 
Second, in order to make these two reforms regarding who will be 
the sole or final arbiter in disqualification disputes worthwhile, all jurists 
and the parties must provide meaningful and timely disclosure of 
possible grounds for conflict or bias.  It is true that under most federal 
and state judicial ethics codes jurists are required to make financial 
disclosure of gifts and other things of value received by the jurist.278  
However, the Code of Conduct for US Judges—which applies to all district 
court judges and justices on the courts of appeals—does not expressly 
require the jurist to disclose known connections with the parties in the 
                                                 
275 See id. at 996–97 (providing that under the de novo standard, the reviewing court 
“approaches the task as if it were the first judicial body to consider the matter”).  By 
contrast, use of the abuse of discretion standard means an erroneous disqualification 
decision would be reversed only if the appellate court found that the “decision is one that 
can[not] be rationally defended.”  Id. at 990. 
276 See Serbulea, supra note 92, at 1138 (suggesting that the loss of impartiality infringes 
on the due process guarantee of a fair trial); see also Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 556 
U.S. 868, 876 (2009) (“It is axiomatic that ‘[a] fair trial in a fair tribunal is a basic 
requirement of due process.’”). 
277 See Marbes, supra note 164, at 250–51 (describing the Bias Blind Spot, “which is the 
tendency to fail to discern one’s own biases while at the same time inferring bias in others” 
(footnote omitted)). 
278 See CODE OF CONDUCT FOR UNITED STATES JUDGES Canon 4H(3) (2009) (“A judge 
should make required financial disclosures, including disclosures of gifts and other things 
of value, in compliance with applicable statutes and Judicial Conference regulations and 
directives.”); see also ABA MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT R. 3.15 (2011) (requiring that 
a judge must “publically report the amount or value of:  (1) compensation received for 
extrajudicial activities . . . ”). 
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litigation.279  Some courts have gone so far as to suggest it is the litigants’ 
burden to ferret out such information.280  Even in jurisdictions where 
jurists have an affirmative obligation to disclose information relevant to 
disqualification, that duty often is limited to only those connections or 
interests that the challenge jurist believes are possibly or likely 
disqualifying.281  Thus, there is currently a lack of meaningful obligation 
to disclose possible disqualifying interests or connections. 
This lack of a consequential judicial disclosure obligation means that 
most litigants lack necessary factual information to easily evaluate the 
actual, probable, or apparent bias of the jurist.  This lack of information 
forces the litigant who believes the jurist may be biased to make one of 
two difficult choices.  First, the litigant can expend significant resources 
investigating the financial, familial, and other connections of the jurist.282  
Second, if the rumored information is serious enough, a party must take 
the risk of making a disqualification motion based upon information and 
belief and requesting the challenged jurist to disclose the suspected 
connections.283  Alternatively, those litigants who lack the resources or 
are not comfortable taking the risk of calling out the jurist actually may 
be denied a right to a fair trial, or the party, and public, may perceive 
such rights has been denied because the decision maker is actually, 
probably, or apparently biased.284  Thus, the procedures governing 
disqualification disputes must be reformed to include an explicit 
obligation on part of jurists to reveal all interests and connections so that 
                                                 
279 See generally CODE OF CONDUCT FOR UNITED STATES JUDGES Canon 3 (2009) (omitting 
language requiring that a judge must disclose a connection to the parties in litigation before 
them). 
280 See, e.g., U.S. ex rel. Am. Textile Mfrs. Inst., Inc. v. The Limited, Inc., 179 F.R.D. 541, 546 
(S.D. OH 1997) (“[l]itigants have a duty to investigate and inform the court of any 
perceived biases before the court and the parties invest time and expense in a case”), rev’d, 
190 F.3d 729 (6th Cir. 1999). 
281 See, e.g., Porter v. Singletary, 49 F.3d 1483, 1489 (11th Cir. 1995) (holding that under 
Florida’s judicial ethics code judges have an ethical duty to “disclose on the record 
information which the judge believes the parties or their lawyers might consider relevant to 
the question of disqualification”). 
282 See, e.g., Motion of Respondent Corporations for Disqualification of Justice Benjamin, 
reprinted in Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 556 U.S. 868 app. at 104a–320a (2009) (No. 
08-22), and Hugh M. Caperton’s Motion for Disqualification Directed to Justice Brent D. 
Benjamin, reprinted in Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 556 U.S. 868 app. at 321a–35a 
(2009) (No. 08-22) (describing information gathered in the investigation of Justice 
Benjamin’s financial connections with Massey and its CEO Blankenship). 
283 See Hugh M. Caperton’s Motion for Disqualification Directed to Justice Elliott E. 
Maynard, A.T. Massey Coal Co. v. Caperton, No. 33350 (W.Va. 2008) (seeking judicial 
disclosure of rumored connections between the challenged Justice Maynard and Massey 
CEO Blankenship). 
284 See Frost, supra note 259, at 568–69 (noting that lack of information and its impact on 
the likelihood that a disqualification motion will even be filed). 
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others—the litigants, other judges, the public, or the press—may 
evaluate the actual, probable, or apparent bias of the jurist. 285 
3. Decisions Denying Disqualification Must Include Reasons and Be in 
Writing and Published 
Third, in order to be legitimate, the decision to deny any recusal 
request must be a “reasoned decision” that is in writing and made 
available to the public.286  Although scholars may not agree on why 
procedural protections legitimize judicial decision making, most do 
agree on the specific procedures that are essential to legitimate 
judging.287  Among those essential procedures is the requirement of a 
“reasoned decision”—a decision for which an articulated rationale has 
been given—which reason is situated within and constrained by 
precedent or another identifiable body of law.288  The legitimizing 
function of the reasoned decision is bolstered by the requirement that the 
decision must be in writing and made available to the public.289  These 
procedures will not only legitimize the specific disqualification decision, 
but will help create an entire body of law on disqualification that will 
guide future disputes and legitimize the judiciary as a whole. 
The practice of articulating a rationale for a decision is the hallmark 
of legitimate judging because giving reasons commits and constrains 
decision-making both with respect to the current decision and future 
disputes.  The rationale commits the decision maker to a broader 
principle because the reasons given for a specific decision creates a more 
abstract or general rule that goes beyond the concrete and specific 
                                                 
285 See supra note 279 and accompanying text (providing that the current ethical rules 
governing most jurists, the ABA Judicial Code of Conduct and U.S. Code of Judicial Conduct, 
already include disclosure requirements for financial interests and gifts, but do not address 
disclosure of other possible conflicts or grounds of bias in specific cases). 
286 See Frost, supra note 259, at 592 (suggesting that producing a reasoned decision is vital 
to maintaining the integrity of the judiciary).  
287 See id. at 555–56 (pointing out that although the sources of judicial legitimacy is 
contested, most agree on “several essential procedural components of adjudication that 
legitimize it as a method of decisionmaking in a democratic society”). 
288 Id.  Listing the five essential procedures for legitimate adjudication as: 
(1) litigants, not courts, initiate disputes; (2) the disputes are presented 
through an adversarial system in which two or more competing parties 
give their conflicting views; (3) a rationale must be given for decisions; 
(4) decisions must refer to, and be restricted by, an identifiable body of 
law; and (5) the decision maker must be impartial. 
Id. (footnote omitted). 
289 See id. at 562 (citing that public declarations are an additional legitimizing procedure 
or feature of judicial decision making). 
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context of the current dispute.290  Also, giving reasons constrains the 
current decision by situating the outcome within an existing and 
identifiable body of law or requiring the decision maker to acknowledge 
a new rule is being created.291  In addition, the requirement of stating the 
rationale for a decision also promotes discipline in decision making by 
making it less likely decisions will be based upon bias, self-interest, or 
intuitive judgments rather than thoughtful reflection, which is 
particularly important given the effects of the Bias Blind Spot.292 
The additional requirement that specific reasons be given in a 
writing made available to the public helps bolster legitimacy of the 
specific decision, while at the same time, it helps creates a more general 
body of law on disqualification.293  The articulation of proper reasons for 
a decision is the best way to communicate with others regarding the 
decision-making process and legitimize the outcome.294  In fact, it is only 
through a reasoned decision that jurists can express that the parties’ 
participation has been meaningful, the jurist heard and understood the 
litigants’ proof and arguments, and the decision reached is not arbitrary, 
capricious or otherwise illegitimate.295  Also, the requirement of a written 
decision aids review of the grounds for the decision—not just by the 
litigants, the press, and the public—but, also by the appellate court.296  
Thus, requiring reasons for denying disqualification will help insure that 
such decisions are based on rational and legitimate grounds and aid 
review of those decisions when necessary. 
                                                 
290 See Frederick Schauer, Giving Reasons, 47 STAN. L. REV. 633, 641 (1995) (“The key point, 
indeed the linchpin for the entire analysis, is that, ordinarily, to provide a reason for a decision 
is to include that decision within a principle of greater generality than the decision itself.” (footnote 
omitted)). 
291 See id. at 652 (explaining that if a jurist cannot articulate reasons for the decision, then 
either the result is not constrained by pre-existing law or there is relevance to some 
principle from which a new rule can be fashioned). 
292 See id. at 657–58 (“A reason-giving mandate will also drive out illegitimate reasons 
when they are the only plausible explanation for particular outcomes.”). 
293 See id. at 638 (noting that a judge is expected to provide, “ordinarily in writing,” the 
reasoning for his or her conclusion). 
294 See id. at 657–58 (concluding that giving reasons may be a sign of respect for those 
affected by the decision and is also a way of opening a conversation to help insure 
participants feel included in the process). 
295 See Lon L. Fuller, The Forms and Limits of Adjudication, 92 HARV. L. REV. 353, 388 (1978) 
(examining whether an arbiter can rest his decision on grounds that are not argued by the 
parties). 
296 See Frost, supra note 259, at 563 (providing that the federal court system requires 
reasoned decision making so that the appellate courts can review the lower court’s 
findings). 
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B. Criticisms and Misplaced Confidence in Jurists’ Impartiality Should Not 
Stand in the Way of Recusal Reforms 
In spite of the genuine concerns for impartiality and clear calls for 
procedural reform of recusal practices—the practice of allowing one to 
“be a judge in his own [disqualification] case” still prevails in the 
majority of federal and state courts.297  This is due, at least in part, to 
resistance by judges and justices to the idea that the challenged jurist 
should be removed from the disqualification decision making process.298  
The reasons given are somewhat varied, but can be reduced to four that 
require a response.  First, critics point to the opportunities for judge 
shopping that are inherent in any disqualification system.299  Second, 
concerns are sometimes expressed regarding the administrative burden 
of such procedural reforms.300  Third, another roadblock to reform is the 
perceived loss of public confidence that allegedly will result from an 
increase in challenges to jurists’ impartiality.301  Fourth, many 
commentators and jurists continue to believe strongly that judges or 
justices are capable because of their integrity, experience, and intellect to 
                                                 
297 See supra Part III.C (discussing federal and state disqualification procedures); see also 
FLAMM, supra note 76, at 516 (noting that a litigant can seek judicial disqualification or 
argue the failure of a judge to recuse himself “as a grounds for error on appeal.” (footnote 
omitted)). 
298 See Geyh, supra note 247, at 701–02 (explaining the “vicious cycle” of judicial 
resistance, recusal reform, and repeated resistance by the bench). 
299 See, e.g., Glassroth v. Moore, 229 F. Supp. 2d 1283, 1286 (M.D. Ala. 2002) (“The 
Eleventh Circuit has articulated an additional important principle to be considered in 
recusal cases:  although the duty to recuse is imperative in close cases, ‘[j]udges must not 
recuse themselves for imaginary reasons; judge shopping should not be encouraged.’”); see 
also Bassett, supra note 116, at 1254 (arguing that proponents to peremptory challenges have 
raised concerns about judge shopping); Seth E. Bloom, Note, Judicial Bias and Financial 
Interest as Grounds for Disqualification of Federal Judges, 35 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 662, 665 
(1985) (“Disqualification law must avoid excessive removal of judges, which may do 
serious harm to public confidence and judicial efficiency and promote judge shopping.”). 
300 See In re Cement Antitrust Litig., 688 F.2d 1297, 1313 (9th Cir. 1982) (demonstrating the 
inefficiency of recusal when “after five years of litigation, a multi-million dollar lawsuit of 
major national importance, with over 200,000 class plaintiffs, grinds to a halt over Mrs. 
Muecke’s $29.70”). 
301 See, e.g., Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 556 U.S. 868, 903 (2009) (Scalia, J., 
dissenting) (arguing that the decision will have the opposite effect and will reinforce 
negative public perception of the judiciary).  Justice Scalia argues: 
What above all else is eroding public confidence in the Nation’s 
judicial system is the perception that litigation is just a game, that the 
party with the most resourceful lawyer can play it to win, that our 
seemingly interminable legal proceedings are wonderfully self-
perpetuating but incapable of delivering real-world justice. 
Id. 
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make the right decision when their impartiality is challenged.302  Finally, 
others point to the availability of appellate review as a check on incorrect 
disqualification decisions.303  However, not one of these concerns should 
stand in the way of reform of recusal procedures because the price paid 
by individual litigants’ loss of the right to a fair trial and the resulting 
damage to the reputation of our judiciary is simply too great to ignore. 
1. Judge Shopping Likely Will Decrease when Challenged Jurists No 
Longer Decide Disqualification 
First, when procedural reforms such as eliminating the challenged 
jurist from the disqualification decision are suggested, critics often argue 
such changes would increase judge shopping.  This criticism is usually 
leveled against calls to adopt peremptory challenges in disqualification 
disputes.  However, in states where peremptory challenges (either with 
or without cause) are already used, there is little empirical evidence 
supporting the conclusion that such methods increase judge shopping.304  
In addition, this Article proposes that each jurisdiction decide which of 
several methods of decision making to adopt, so long as the challenged 
jurist is not the real decision maker.305  Thus, concerns about judge 
shopping are misplaced in this instance because courts are free to select a 
method that requires litigants seeking to use disqualification to judge 
shop to prove to another judge or justice that the challenged jurist lacks 
impartiality.  Most jurists are more reluctant to decide a colleague is 
                                                 
302 See, e.g., 2011 YEAR-END REPORT ON THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY, supra note 118, at 10 
(discussing recusal).  Chief Justice Roberts states: 
I have complete confidence in the capability of my colleagues to 
determine when recusal is warranted.  They are jurists of exceptional 
integrity and experience whose character and fitness have been 
examined through a rigorous appointment and confirmation process.  I 
know that they each give careful consideration to any recusal 
questions that arise in the course of their judicial duties.  We are all 
deeply committed to the common interest in preserving the Court’s 
vital role as an impartial tribunal governed by the rule of law. 
Id. 
303 See Stempel, supra note 258, at 753–54 (addressing the argument that appellate review 
of potentially erroneous disqualification decisions is available and finding such review 
lacking). 
304 See ALAN J. CHASET, DISQUALIFICATION OF FEDERAL JUDGES BY PEREMPTORY 
CHALLENGE, FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER 26–27 (1981) (“Several of the state statutes have 
been in place for a long time, but little has been written about them or their operation:  
there appears to be only one empirical study that is sufficiently thorough to be useful.” 
(footnote omitted)) 
305 See infra Part V.B (discussing the criticisms surrounding jurists’ impartiality). 
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 49, No. 3 [2015], Art. 10
https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol49/iss3/10
2015] Reshaping Recusal Procedures 861 
disqualified than to recuse themselves.306  So, it is unlikely that 
eliminating self-disqualification will lead to increased opportunities for 
judge shopping.  In fact, the opposite result—a decrease in judge 
shopping—is the more likely result of this proposed procedural reform. 
2. Administrative Burdens Are Outweighed By the Benefits of Recusal 
Reform 
Second, the administrative burdens of the proposed reforms of 
recusal procedures are far outweighed by the actual costs in terms of 
denial of litigants’ Due Process and the negative impact on public 
confidence in the judiciary.  Since a challenged jurist—like the rest of 
us—cannot be impartial about his own impartiality, the risk of biased 
decisions is not limited to “extraordinary circumstances.”307  Rather, it is 
a systematic error with which litigants (and their lawyers) must deal 
each and every day in courts where the challenged jurist is the sole or 
final decision maker in a disqualification dispute.308  Given the enormous 
number of opportunities for this error throughout the federal and state 
court systems—erroneous disqualification decisions have the potential to 
create a serious impact in actual cases decided throughout the United 
States.309  So, by removing the challenged jurist at the outset (either 
through peremptory challenges or substituting another decision maker), 
                                                 
306 See JEFFREY M. SHAMAN & JONA GOLDSCHMIDT, JUDICIAL DISQUALIFICATION:  AN 
EMPIRICAL STUDY OF JUDICIAL PRACTICES AND ATTITUDES 66–67 (1995) (describing a survey 
that shows judges are more likely to disqualify themselves than to disqualify their 
colleagues). 
307 See Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 556 U.S. 868, 887 (2009) (describing the timing, 
amount, and relative size of the campaign support offered to Justice Benjamin as creating 
an extraordinary situation). 
308 See SAMPLE ET AL., supra note 123, at 26 (describing that a total of nineteen states 
permit parties to use some form of peremptory challenge to remove one judge per 
proceeding); see also FLAMM supra note 76, at 753 (“[A] substantial minority of states have 
adopted statutes or court rules that permit a party to seek judicial disqualification on a 
peremptory basis.”).  However, in most states, the peremptory challenge can be used by a 
party only once in a proceeding.  Id. 
309 See R. LAFOUNTAIN ET AL., NAT’L CTR. STATE CTS., EXAMINING THE WORK OF STATE 
COURTS:  AN ANALYSIS OF 2010 STATE COURT CASELOADS (Sept. 25, 2012), 
http://www.courtstatistics.org/Other-Pages/StateCourtCaseloadStatistics.aspx, archived at 
http://perma.cc/7ER5-7PYV (stating that in 2010, the various state courts handled a total 
of approximately 19,000,000 civil and 20,000,000 criminal cases for a total of around 
38,000,000 new cases (excluding domestic relations, juvenile, and traffic cases) that year).  
Of that total, approximately 5,565,000 civil cases were instituted in one of the seventeen 
states that permit litigants to use peremptory challenges to remove a judge without any 
cause.  Id.  So, that leaves approximately 13,435,000 cases brought in the state courts in 
which the decision to insure a fair trial before a fair tribunal relied on the use of “self-
disqualification” by the challenged jurist.  Id. 
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we actually will improve the efficiency by decreasing the number of 
likely appeals from denials of disqualification motions.  So, rather than 
decrease efficiency, the suggested procedural reform will increase 
efficiency. 
Moreover, removing the challenged jurist from the disqualification 
decision (or at least subjecting a denial to immediate de novo review by 
another judge or justice) properly protects the primary purposes of 
partiality—fair trials and institutional legitimacy.  When a jurist who 
reasonably appears to be biased erroneously decides she need not step 
aside, that error may negatively impact the litigants’ rights to a fair trial 
before a fair tribunal by introducing the jurist’s bias into the decision 
making process.310  The mistaken disqualification decision also effects 
public confidence in the justice system as a whole by creating negative 
perceptions of the jurist, which effect institutional legitimacy.311  In fact, 
the appearance of an unfair process may do more harm than the actual 
results reached in the particular cases as people are more likely to accept 
unfavorable or unexpected results if the decision making process is 
perceived as fair.312  Thus, preservation of fair trials and public 
confidence in the judiciary demands that we refocus recusal reforms on 
procedural protections that remove the challenged jurist as the decision 
maker. 
3. The Public Will Not Lose Confidence in the Judiciary as a Result of 
Recusal Reform 
Third, given the nature of these suggested procedural reforms there 
is no reason to believe that the public will have less confidence in specific 
disqualification decisions or the judiciary generally.  The opposite is 
likely to be true since all of the suggested reforms—starting with 
removal of a potentially biased decision maker—make the process more 
transparent, which usually increases institutional legitimacy and 
adherence to outcomes.313  In fact, it is hard to imagine how removing 
                                                 
310 See supra Part IV (describing the important implications for judicial disqualification 
and public confidence in the judiciary). 
311 Tyler & Rasinski, supra note 264, at 626–27. 
312 See Kees van den Bos et al., Evaluating Outcomes by Means of the Fair Process Effect:  
Evidence for Different Processes in Fairness and Satisfaction Judgments, 74 J. PERSONALITY & 
SOC. PSYCHOL. 1493, 1494 (1998) (“One of the most important discoveries in research on 
procedural and distributive justice has been the finding that perceived procedural fairness 
positively affects how people react to outcomes.  This instance of the fair process effect is 
one of the most frequently replicated findings in social psychology.” (citations omitted)). 
313 See supra note 264 and accompanying text (discussing direct and indirect casual 
connections between perceived fairness of court procedures, institutional legitimacy, and 
adherence to unpopular court decisions). 
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the potentially biased decision maker and giving litigants more 
meaningful appellate review would result in less confidence (by the 
parties or the public) in the fairness of the process.  Moreover, when 
powerful voices have suggested that reform may lead to more charges of 
biased jurists and a loss of public confidence in the judiciary, those 
criticisms have been directed at proposed substantive reforms that 
would increase the number of grounds for disqualification, not reform 
the procedural practices.314  Thus, it seems likely that a more transparent 
process is likely to increase rather than decrease confidence in specific 
disqualification decisions and the impartiality of the judiciary as a 
whole. 
4. Even Intelligent, Informed, and Well-Intentioned Jurists Have a Bias 
Blind Spot 
Fourth, the conviction—no matter how genuine—that jurists are 
capable of making unbiased decisions about their own biases simply is 
not supported by the scientific evidence.  In fact, the existence and effects 
of the Bias Blind Spot have not been seriously challenged in any of the 
cognitive or social psychology studies performed to date.315  Also, there 
have been empirical studies demonstrating that jurists are subject to a 
variety of other cognitive biases just as are ordinary people.316  In 
addition, there exists no scientific evidence to support the belief that the 
more intelligent among us are less prone to the Bias Blind Spot.317  In 
fact, what little evidence does exist on the subject supports the contrary 
conclusion—that those who are more intelligent are more likely to 
believe they can overcome this cognitive illusion.318 
                                                 
314 See, e.g., Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 556 U.S. 868, 893–98 (2009) (Roberts, J., 
dissenting) (posing forty questions about the changed substantive standards for 
disqualification under the Due Process Clause). 
315 See Joachim I. Krueger & David C. Funder, Towards a Balanced Social Psychology:  
Causes, Consequences, and Cures for the Problem-Seeking Approach to Social Behavior and 
Cognition, 27 BEHAV. & BRAIN SCI. 1, 5 (2004) (reviewing the literature on a variety of 
cognitive illusions and noting no studies that seriously question the existence of the Bias 
Blind Spot). 
316 See Guthrie et al., supra note 239, at 4 (demonstrating that judges are just as likely to be 
affected by a number of cognitive illusions as the ordinary public). 
317 See Richard F. West et al., Cognitive Sophistication Does Not Attenuate Bias Blind Spot, 
103 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 506, 516 (2012) (indicating the lack of other scientific 
studies testing whether superior intellect may ameliorate the effects of the Bias Blind Spot 
on certain cognitive functions). 
318 See id. at 515 (providing that the bias blind spot effect is “unmitigated by increases in 
intelligence [and this result is] consistent with the idea that the mechanisms that cause the 
bias [blind spot] are quite fundamental and not easily controlled strategically [because the 
cognitive mechanisms at work are] evolutionary and computationally basic”). 
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Moreover, the conviction that judges are somehow immune to the 
cognitive processes that produce the Bias Blind Spot simply does not 
resonate with the common sense views held by many litigants, the press, 
and the public, as well as commentators.  While our system of 
disqualification inherited from English common law included a strong 
presumption of judicial impartiality, in the 19th Century some legal 
thinkers began to challenge that view as advances were being made in 
the psychological sciences.319  In addition, the naïve conviction that 
jurists are immune to the Bias Blind Spot is belied by a common sense 
review of those disqualification disputes for which we do have written 
reasons why the jurist chose to not step aside.320  As a result, there is no 
scientific nor common sense reason to doubt that, just like the rest of us, 
jurists are affected by the Bias Blind Spot.  Thus, procedural reforms that 
prohibit the challenged jurist from being the sole or final arbiter of his or 
her own biases and other procedural changes designed to make the 
process more transparent should not be further stymied by this 
misplaced confidence in judicial impartiality. 
5. Appellate Review Procedures Do Not Erase Errors in 
Disqualification Disputes 
Finally, if the challenged jurist declines to disqualify himself and in 
so doing makes an erroneous decision because he is actually, probably, 
or apparently biased, there is a right to appellate review (except in the 
case of SCOTUS)—but there is little chance the decision will be corrected 
on appeal.  The likelihood of reversal on appeal is remote for at least four 
reasons.  First, only a fraction of those erroneous disqualification 
decisions will ever be appealed given the litigant’s limited time, money, 
and other resources.321  Second, meaningful review of erroneous 
                                                 
319 See, e.g., David Dudley Field, A Few Words on Judicial Integrity, 6 ALB. L.J. 265, 265 
(1872) (“Judges are but men, and are swayed like other men by vehement prejudices.  This 
is corruption in reality, give it whatever other name you please.”); Civil Rights (1883):  
Robert Green Ingersoll, SECULAR WEB, http://infidels.org/library/historical/ 
robert_ingersoll/civil_rights.html (last visited Mar. 25, 2015), archived at 
http://perma.cc/JT25-WHA6 [hereinafter Robert Green Ingersoll] (“We must remember, too, 
that we have to make judges out of men, and that by being made judges their prejudices 
are not diminished and their intelligence is not increased.”). 
320 See supra Part III (discussing cases from the highest courts in federal and state 
judiciary where jurists attempt to explain their lack of bias apparently without considering 
or even acknowledging that reasonable others may view the situation differently). 
321 See Court Statistics Project, State Court Caseload Statistics, NAT’L CTR. STATE CTS. (2012), 
http://www.courtstatistics.org/Other-Pages/StateCourtCaseloadStatistics.aspx, archived at 
http://perma.cc/7ER5-7PYV (explaining that in 2010, although a total of 37,945,591 civil 
and criminal cases were pending in the state courts, only 272,975 appeals were filed in 
either the intermediate court of appeal or the court of last resort in all fifty states).  In 2013, 
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decisions is often not available due to the largely discretionary nature of 
the right to review most disqualification decisions.322  Third, even when 
there is a right to appeal, the standard for review on appeal and the 
accompanying procedures result in delayed and less than meaningful 
reviews of such decisions.323  Fourth, some studies have found that due 
to cultural norms, jurists are less likely to direct disqualification of a 
colleague on their court or another court than they are to step aside 
themselves—even though recusal is a rare occurrence in cases not 
involving per se disqualification standards.324  Thus, even though the 
litigant may have a right to appeal the disqualification decision, the right 
does not provide meaningful relief in a large number of cases where an 
erroneous decision has been made. 
Although all three of these factors impact the effectiveness of the 
appellate review of any disqualification decisions, it may not be possible 
for the judiciary to address all of these issues effectively.  First, the 
judiciary can do little or nothing to increase the time, money, and other 
resources that litigants have available to appeal seemingly erroneous 
disqualification decisions.  Second, while judicial education regarding 
the impact of cognitive biases affecting judicial decisions may improve 
the understanding and perspective jurists bring to disqualification 
disputes, that type of reform effort takes time and requires regular 
reinforcement.  Moreover, we simply do not know if educating jurists in 
this way actually will work and what little evidence there is regarding 
the impact of such efforts suggests that enlightening people about the 
Bias Blind Spot and other cognitive errors does not negate their effect on 
our thinking.325  Thus, it appears that the judiciary can have little 
                                                                                                             
although a total of 375,870 new cases, including 284,604 civil cases, were filed in the federal 
district courts, only 56,475 appeals (or fewer than 17% of pending cases) were commenced 
in the United States Courts of Appeals.  JUDICIAL BUSINESS OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS:  
ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR 2013, U.S. COURTS, http://www.uscourts.gov/ 
statistics/judicialbusiness/2013.aspx (last visited Apr. 21, 2015), archived at 
http://perma.cc/2RLP-NPTL. 
322 See supra Part V.A.1.b (describing the connection between the right to review and the 
discretionary nature of making the decision). 
323 See Stempel, supra note 258, at 804–05 (arguing that abuse of discretion and harmless 
error standards should be replaced by a de novo review because disqualification decisions 
made by the challenged jurist is suspect given a host of biasing influences and a 
professional culture that creates reluctant recusants). 
324 See SHAMAN & GOLDSCHMIDT, supra note 306, at 67 (“The data from this survey show 
that judges are more inclined to disqualify themselves than they are to recommend that a 
colleague do so.  This finding, it could be argued, militates against having another judge 
rule on the disqualification issue.”). 
325 See Pronin & Kugler, supra note 183, at 566–67 (explaining that the limited research 
conducted on the effects of educational efforts demonstrates that while such efforts might 
increase awareness of the existence of this cognitive illusion, there is no scientific support 
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meaningful impact on the first two factors, so procedures must be 
reformed to create meaningful change. 
VI.  THE PURPOSES OF IMPARTIALITY 
Of course, any proposed reform of disqualification practices should 
promote the underlying purposes of judicial impartiality.  There are a 
myriad of ways one could identify and explain those underlying 
purposes of judicial impartiality.  First, an evaluation of the federal and 
state substantive standards for disqualification (whether code or 
common law based) and their application would reveal some explicit 
and implicit goals of judicial impartiality.  Second, a similar review of the 
federal and state standards for judicial conduct and their application also 
would reveal a clearer understanding of the goals of those rules.  Third, 
an assessment of historical materials that address the initial 
establishment of our tri-parte system of government and the role of the 
judiciary in that structure would reveal yet other desired reasons for 
judicial impartiality.  However, in this Article, the purposes of partiality 
will be assessed using the framework developed by Dean and Professor 
Charles Gardner Geyh in his recent piece exploring “the three 
dimensions of impartiality” in our judicial system.326 
A. The Three Dimensions of Impartiality 
There are three distinct, but somewhat overlapping, dimensions of 
impartiality:  the procedural, the political, and the ethical.327  The 
“procedural dimension” of impartiality is aimed at affording the 
particular parties in a specific case a fair hearing, which necessarily 
requires a fair decision maker.328  The “political dimension” of 
                                                                                                             
for the idea that education can overcome the effects of the Bias Blind Spot).  Further, an 
experiment in which participants who were educated about the pitfalls of relying on 
introspection tended to cease claiming they were less prone to bias but noting such 
education made no actual impact on participants’ decision making.  Id.; see also Cynthia 
McPherson Frantz, I AM Being Fair:  The Bias Blind Spot as a Stumbling Block to Seeing Both 
Sides, 28 BASIC & APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 157, 166 (2006) (discussing the backfiring effect of 
efforts to educate others about unconscious bias and correcting for liking or disliking 
somebody). 
326 See The Dimensions of Judicial Impartiality, supra note 21, at 493 (“judicial impartiality 
[can be conceptualized] in three distinct dimensions:  a procedural dimension, . . . a 
political dimension, . . . and an ethical dimension”). 
327 See id. (discussing the procedural, political, and ethical dimensions). 
328 See id. at 511 (discussing the interest of judicial impartiality).  Geyh discusses the 
procedural dimension of impartiality as follows: 
[T]he interest [of the parties] in judicial impartiality is personal to 
them, acutely felt, case-specific, and shaped by firsthand experience.  
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impartiality is concerned with the role that jurists play in the 
administration of justice and the public’s perceptions of how that role is 
served within the larger governmental structure.329  The focus of the 
ethical dimension is yet a different constituency—jurists themselves, 
who have a stake in not only the legitimacy that impartiality creates for 
the judiciary as a whole but how it shapes their own identity in their role 
within that legal institution.330  Thus, any proposed reforms of recusal 
practices will be viewed through these three lenses:  the procedural 
dimension, the political dimension, and the ethical dimension. 
B. A Framework for Assessing Recusal Reforms 
This Article uses these three dimensions of impartiality as a 
framework for assessing the current state of disqualification practice and 
to evaluate the proposed reforms of recusal procedures.  This type of 
application of Dean Geyh’s three-part framework of impartiality appears 
to be exactly how he hoped scholars would use his work.331  Also, this 
                                                                                                             
The focus of their attention is on the process employed to litigate their 
cases, and whether that process protected them adequately from the 
perils of partiality . . . .  This, then, is the procedural dimension of 
impartiality. 
Id. 
329 See id. at 512 (distinguishing the connection between the public’s interest and an 
impartial judiciary).  Geyh states: 
[T]he public’s interest in an impartial judiciary is less personal than 
philosophical or ideological, more diffuse than acute, systematic rather 
than case-specific . . . and shaped less by firsthand experience than by 
impressions gleaned from public discussions on the acceptability of 
judges to the body politic.  In other words, the focus of the public’s 
attention is on the impartiality of judges in relation to the role they 
play in the administration of government, which is ‘political’ in the 
original sense of the term. 
Id. 
330 See The Dimensions of Judicial Impartiality, supra note 21, at 512 (discussing the interest 
of judges in impartiality).  The following describes the dimensions of impartiality:   
As adjudicators at the center of the litigation process, judges have an 
interest in the procedural dimension of impartiality; as representatives 
of the third branch of government, judges desire institutional 
legitimacy and consequently have an interest in the political dimension 
of impartiality, too.  But as women and men whose self-identity as 
good judges is tethered to the oath they have sworn to be impartial—
an oath judges have taken for centuries—there is a third dimension of 
impartiality:  an ethical dimension. 
Id. 
331 See id. at 493 (describing the need to re-think judicial impartiality).  Geyh explains: 
Scholars have traditionally analyzed judicial impartiality piecemeal, in 
disconnected debates on discrete topics.  As a consequence, current 
understandings of judicial impartiality are balkanized and muddled.  
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three dimensional perspective of impartiality fits neatly within much of 
what SCOTUS has, in its Due Process Clause cases, declared about the 
purposes of impartiality in our judicial system. 332  Thus, this Article uses 
the framework of the three dimensions to assess judicial impartiality and 
proposed reforms of current procedures and practices used to decide 
disqualification disputes. 
1. Promoting Fairness in Litigation 
First, in the procedural dimension, if the proposed reforms are 
adopted, then the parties are more likely to get a fair trial than is possible 
using the self-disqualification method.  This is true because any jurist 
who was actually, probably, or even apparently biased has been 
removed from the decision making process through either peremptory 
challenges, reassignment of the disqualification dispute to another jurist, 
or immediate de novo review of any self-disqualification decision.333  
When that kind of structural bias is eliminated, we necessarily improve 
the outcomes. 
In addition, the other proposed procedural protections will promote 
more openness and transparency that will positively affect outcomes in 
disqualification disputes.  The requirement of full disclosure of all 
interests and connections beyond the more limited disclosures now 
required by both the jurist and the parties will help insure that all the 
relevant information is available to both the litigants and the decision 
maker.  Also, the mandate of a written and published opinion when 
disqualification is denied will help because if the targeted jurist or other 
neutral decision maker knows her reasoning process will be subject to 
                                                                                                             
This Article seeks to reconceptualize judicial impartiality 
comprehensively, across all contexts.  . . .  [Thus], this Article offers a 
new perspective, not just on judicial impartiality, but also on the role 
of the American judiciary in the administration of justice and the 
political process. 
Id. 
332 See, e.g., Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 556 U.S. 868, 869, 877 (2009) (“Because the 
objective standards implementing the Due Process Clause do not require proof of actual 
bias, . . . [but do require disqualification when] ‘experience teaches that the probability of 
actual bias on the part of the judge or decisionmaker is too high to be constitutionally 
tolerable.’”); Marshall v. Jerrico, Inc., 446 U.S. 238, 242 (1980) (declaring the need to 
“preserve[] both the appearance and the reality of fairness, ‘[which] generat[es] the 
feeling[], so important to a popular government, that justice has been done’ . . . by ensuring 
that no person will be deprived of his interests in the absence of a proceeding in which he 
may present his case with assurance that the arbiter is not predisposed to find against 
him”); see also In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 136 (1955) (finding that an impartial judge is 
necessary to maintain the legitimacy of court proceedings). 
333 See Stempel, supra note 258, at 804–05 (discussing the benefits of alternative forms of 
review). 
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some review, then she is more likely to insure that the reasoning is 
sound and meets the objective standard for disqualification.  However, 
even if outcomes in disqualification disputes are not changed by these 
proposed procedural reforms, at least the litigants’ comfort level will be 
increased by having an impartial jurist (or group of jurists) decide or 
immediately review the question of disqualification using the decision 
making process should give the parties more confidence in the 
outcome—even if the result is not to their liking. 
2. Promoting Public Confidence in the Courts 
Second, in the political dimension, these proposed changes mean the 
public also is more likely to have confidence in the impartiality of the 
specific jurist who hears the case and, in turn, the judicial system 
generally.  This is true because when the potentially biased jurist who is 
the target of the disqualification motion is removed, the process is more 
impartial—or at least appears to be more open and fair.  This resulting 
impartiality or perception of impartiality is bolstered by the twin 
requirements of complete disclosure and a full explanation that must be 
written and published if disqualification is denied.  These more 
transparent procedures allow the public (as well as the litigants) to better 
understand the reasoning behind the disqualification decision.  Again, 
the use of a seemingly fair process—which is in keeping with procedural 
norms used for other litigation—helps the public accept even negative 
outcomes in controversial cases.  Thus, the proposed reforms will help 
enhance public perceptions of the impartiality of the bench by using 
disqualification procedures that eliminate or at least mostly avoid 
inherent biases (including the Bias Blind Spot) and do so using an open 
and transparent process. 
3. Promoting the Role of Jurists as Ethical Actors 
Third, in the ethical dimension, the proposed recusal reforms will 
promote an enhanced view of jurists as ethical actors among not only the 
parties and the public, but among members of the bench.  As noted 
above, the proposed changes in the identity of the decision maker and 
the openness of the process will create a perception of greater fairness 
among the parties and the public, which in turn will create goodwill for 
the entire judiciary and individual members of the bench.  Also, while 
jurists concerned about their own roles and reputations for impartiality 
may be a bit uneasy about another jurist making these disqualification 
decisions, there are some built-in safeguards.  The targeted jurists should 
be somewhat comforted that in nearly all instances the question is not 
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about actual or even probable partiality but merely the appearance of 
possible bias (and if peremptory challenges are adopted no bias need be 
alleged).  Also, since the proposed reforms do not require jurists to write 
and publish an opinion supporting a decision to recuse, the jurist can 
still quietly step aside when needed.  In addition, since most jurists are 
even less likely to disqualify a colleague than recuse themselves, the 
instances of removal of a judge or justice from a specific case should not 
be so frequent as to unfairly jeopardize a specific jurists’ ethical 
reputation.  Moreover, this kind of self-policing of the profession will 
likely enhance the public perception of jurists as committed to the rule of 
impartiality—counterbalancing any negative effects that might come 
from a more open and transparent review of those situations when a 
jurist does not self-disqualify and that decision is reversed after review 
by others.  Thus, all jurists—even when the subject of recusal requests—
will benefit from the increased confidence the reforms create in the 
parties and the public, as well as a renewed sense of professionalism 
among members of the bench. 
Using this three-part framework, the reforms to disqualification 
procedures proposed in this Article appear to support and even enhance 
the procedural, the political, and the ethical dimensions of impartiality. 
VII.  CONCLUSION 
In recent years, several high profile disqualification disputes have 
caught the attention of the press, the pundits, and the public, and have 
raised serious questions about the impartiality of specific jurists and the 
judiciary generally.  While it is too early to determine whether these 
controversies will create a long-term impact on the public’s confidence in 
the courts, it is not too early to reform recusal practices to address one of 
the most significant problems—the impact of the Bias Blind Spot on 
disqualification decisions.  The needed reforms could be achieved by 
either modifying substantive standards or changing procedural 
practices.  Given that there is little agreement on the substantive 
standards for judicial bias beyond the currently enumerated grounds for 
disqualification, the best possible way to eliminate the Bias Blind Spot is 
to reshape the procedures used to decide disqualification disputes. 
The recusal reforms should not only avoid this cognitive pitfall, but 
should further the primary purposes of impartiality:  the protection of 
litigants’ rights to a fair trial, the maintenance of public confidence in the 
courts, and the support of jurists’ roles as ethical actors in the legal 
systems.  The procedural reforms that are most likely to affect significant 
change in disqualification disputes demand we:  (1) remove the 
challenged jurist from the disqualification decision or replace the 
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deferential abuse of discretion appellate review standard with a de novo 
review standard and permit intermediate or interlocutory appeals when 
disqualification is denied; (2) require meaningful and timely disclosure 
of potential conflicts by both the jurists and the parties; and (3) mandate 
that all decisions denying disqualification give reasons for the result, be 
written, and made available to the public.  This reshaping of recusal 
procedures can go a long way towards protecting litigants’ rights to a 
fair trial and preserving the institutional legitimacy of the judiciary, and, 
if these reforms are honored by the bench, correcting our vision of jurists 
as ethical actors within our democracy. 
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